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Articles
Treason and Terror: A Toxic Brew
B. Mitchell Simpson, III*
INTRODUCTION

Loyalty is the obligation that holds all levels of society
together. From families and personal relations, to large and
complex states, loyalty promotes cohesion and stability. The
classic depiction of loyalty is Socrates’ refusal to flee Athens to
avoid an unjust death sentence because, as a citizen of Athens, he
had agreed to obey its laws and therefore, flight would be
disloyal.1 Betrayal is the opposite of loyalty, and when betrayal is
applied to states, it is treason.2 Betrayal and its frequent
companion, violence, have been recurring themes in human affairs
and remain so to this day.
States, as well as individuals, have exercised their undoubted
right to protect themselves against betrayal by creating the
offense of treason. Treason is an ancient offense, having been first
* Adjunct Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law.
I am indebeted to my collegaues, Professors Carl Bogus, Edward Eberle, and
Colleen Murphy, all of Roger Williams Univeristy School of Law, and to
Professor George Walker, Wake Forest Univeristy School of Law, for their
encouragement and helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
1. PLATO, Crito, in THE WORKS OF PLATO 102–103 (1928).
2. See DAVID PRYCE-JONES, TREASON OF THE HEART: FROM THOMAS
PAINE TO KIM PHILBY (2011), for an interesting study of various persons who
have been disloyal and may have committed treason. See also ERIC FELTEN,
LOYALTY: THE VEXING VIRTUE (2011), for a more general analysis of loyalty
and the absence of it.
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codified in the Anglo-American legal system in 1352.3 More
recently, it has been strictly defined in the United States
Constitution.4 The basic concept of treason is to punish a betrayer
of the larger community, regardless of whether the betrayer be the
king or the state. Historically, treason has remained constant
from its codification at the height of the Middle Ages to its
inclusion in the Constitution, written in 1787, at the height of the
Enlightenment. In our jurisprudence, its original purpose was to
punish those who would kill or betray the king. Under the United
States Constitution, the intention to punish betrayal remains;
however, it is limited to just two specific acts: levying war against
the United States or adhering to its enemies by giving them aid
and comfort.5
Since gaining its independence in 1776, the United States on
numerous occasions, has invoked treason, as defined in the
Constitution, to punish perceived or actual betrayal.6 The
Continental Congress in 1776 realized that independence required
treason laws to protect the newly independent states from disloyal
citizens. The courts have produced a notable body of case law that
has defined, analyzed, and applied the constitutional definition of
treason to specific fact patterns. However, most of these cases
have gone no further than the lower courts. Notedly, it was not
until 1945 that the Supreme Court reviewed a treason conviction
for the first time.7
Historically, the law of treason developed in the context of
traditional international conflict, which is conflict between
organized states, usually by traditional armed forces. Treason
applied to those persons who breached the duty of loyalty owed to
their own country, by doing something to help an enemy. Recent
examples include Jane Fonda visiting North Vietnam, and John
Walker Lindh sojourning in Afghanistan; both of which received

3. 4 Halsbury’s Statutes of England 273. However, a more convenient
source is Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 16 n.22 (1945), in which the
text of the entire statute is set forth.
4. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2.
5. Id.
6. Associated Press, Past Americans Charged With Treason, FOX NEWS
(Dec. 17, 2001), http://www.foxnews.com/story/2001/12/17/past-americanscharged-with-treason.html.
7. Cramer, 325 U.S. at 1.

2018]

TREASON AND TERROR

3

much public notoriety as well as accusations of treason.8 Fonda
espoused the North Vietnamese cause, and visited Hanoi while
American servicemen (including the future Senator John McCain)
were imprisoned in the notorious prison camp the “Hanoi Hilton.”9
Lindh was associated with the Taliban and was captured in
Afghanistan.10 Although generally unknown to the American
public, Adam Gadahn appeared in several al Qaeda videos.11
Did these individuals commit treason? Only Gadahn has
been formally charged with treason by adhering to the enemy and
giving them aid and comfort.12 Many believe Fonda and Lindh
should have been tried for treason.13 The justifications for
refusing to prosecute Fonda and Lindh for treason are complex.
For instance, one important factor was that the facts might not
support convictions. Another likely reason Fonda was not charged
with treason was the unruly domestic divisiveness caused by the
Vietnam War. Lindh was charged with numerous other offenses
and ultimately pled guilty to only two counts.14 Lindh is currently
serving a twenty-year sentence.15
However, today there is a new form of conflict mostly waged
by small groups of non-state actors working in the shadows of

8. Colby Itkowitz, How Jane Fonda’s 1972 trip to North Vietnam earned
her the nickname ‘Hanoi Jane,’ THE WASH. POST (Sept. 18 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/retropolis/wp/2017/09/18/how-janefondas-1972-trip-to-north-vietnam-earned-her-the-nickname-hanoi-jane/
?utm_term=.dfd8f13a16fc; Paul Theroux, Pardon the American Taliban, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 22, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/23/opinion/
sunday/pardon-the-american-taliban.html?mcubz=0.
9. HENRY MARK HOLZER & ERIKA HOLZER, AID AND COMFORT: JANE
FONDA IN NORTH VIETNAM 1 (2002).
10. Theroux, supra note 8.
11. Adam
Gadahn
Fast
Facts,
CNN
(Aug.
17,
2016),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/23/us/adam-gadahn-fast-facts/index.html.
12. First Superseding Indictment, United States v. Gadahn, SA CR 05254(A) (C.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2006), available at http:// www.usdoj.gov/opa/
documents/adam_indictment.pdf [hereinafter Gadahn Indictment].
13. Itkowitz, supra note 8; Theroux, supra note 8. For the purposes of
this article, the Fonda and Lindh cases are illustrative of the passions they
have aroused.
14. Neil A. Lewis, American Who Joined Taliban Pleads Guilty, N.Y.
TIMES (Jul. 15, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/15/national/americanwho-joined-taliban-pleads-guilty.html?mcubz=0.
15. See infra note 304 and accompanying text.
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modern society, both at home and abroad.16 The American
response has been dubbed “the war against terror” both on foreign
soil and within the United States. Small groups of individuals
attacked the United States abroad by bombing the embassy in
Kenya17 and the USS Cole in Yemen,18 and also killed almost
three-thousand people in attacks on New York City and the
Pentagon on September 11, 2001.19
The continuing threat to the United States from such groups
is real and dangerous. Public security is rightly a major concern
in contemporary America. The possibility still remains that an
attack could occur in the United States, such as a suicide attack
by a small group of individuals. There are many statutes in effect
that provide important legal weapons in the war against
terrorism.20 These statutes provide criminal penalties for a
variety of acts that may be committed by anyone, regardless of
whether that person owes a duty of loyalty to the United States.21
However, the treason statute is unique.22 It only applies to
persons who owe a duty of loyalty to the United States, and thus
the treason statute applies to the so-called “homegrown
terrorists.”23 The statute defines treason as a breach of loyalty;
only criminalizing levying war against the United States or
16. Sam Finegold & Gina Kim, Treason in the War on Terror, HARVARD
POLITICAL REVIEW (Dec. 7, 2011, 10:02 PM), http://harvardpolitics.com/covers/
constitution/treason-in-the-war-on-terror/.
17. Rescuers search for life in rubble of Nairobi bomb attack, CNN (Aug.
8, 1998, 2:05 AM), http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/africa/9808/07/africa.
explosions.04/.
18. Raphael Perl & Ronald O’Rourke, Terrorist Attack on USS Cole:
Background and Issues for Congress, NAVAL HISTORY AND HERITAGE COMMAND
(Jan. 30, 2001), https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-readingroom/title-list-alphabetically/t/terrorist-attack-on-uss-cole-background-andissues-for-congress.html. On October 12, 2000, suicide terrorists attacked the
USS Cole with a small boat of explosives in Yemen. Id.
19. Peter L. Bergen, September 11 attacks, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/event/September-11-attacks (last visited Sept. 9,
2017).
20. In addition to the Treason statute (18 U.S.C. § 2381), there are two
broad statutes, Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (18 U.S.C. § 2332a), and
Acts of Terrorism Transcending National Boundaries (18 U.S.C. § 2332b),
which cover a wide variety of proscribed acts. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2381, 2332a,
2332b (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-51).
21. Id. § 2332a (Westlaw); § 2332b (Westlaw).
22. Id. § 2381 (Westlaw).
23. See id.

2018]

TREASON AND TERROR

5

adhering to its enemies by rendering them aid and comfort.24 The
Constitution, and the treason statute under it, have provided the
union with a powerful weapon to protect itself and to punish
wrongdoers.
In the twenty-first century, treason is an appropriate legal
weapon in the war against domestic terrorism. For example, a
small group of American citizens or residents could plan and
execute an attack against one or more soft targets, the effects of
which could be significant, even if they are not as devastating as
the attacks on September 11th. Depending on the attackers’
intent, they could be tried for treason.
In an attempt to provide a greater insight as to why a treason
charge would be appropriate in these new situations, Part I of this
Article will explain why treason is the greatest of all crimes, and
then examine the law of treason as it has developed and been
applied under the Constitution. Part II of this Article will discuss
the treason clause in the Constitution and its origins. Part III will
discuss the early American experience with treason trials under
the Constitution, mostly involving questions of levying war
against the United States. Part IV examines the second prong of
treason—adhering to the enemy by giving aid and comfort—and
how courts have dealt with this in the twentieth century. Finally,
Part V will conclude that, under the appropriate circumstances,
acts of terror committed against the United States by citizens or
non-citizen residents constitute treason as defined in the
Constitution.
I.

TREASON: THE GREATEST OF ALL CRIMES

Treason is a crime of betrayal on the grandest scale possible,
worse than any other major felony, such as murder or arson. It
has no individual victims because it is a crime against all
members of the state. Treason “imports a betraying, treachery, or
breach of faith.”25 It requires both an act and an intent, which
may be inferred from the act itself. Our constitutional definition
of treason is directly derived from its first codification in 1352 in
24. See id.
25. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 75
(facsimile of the first edition of 1765–1769, London & Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1979) (1769).
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the statute of 25 Edward III.26 At that time, under the feudal
order, there was no state in the modern sense. This medieval
statute only proscribed acts that constituted a breach of faith
(loyalty) by a lord or other vassal against the king because the
king was at the apex of the feudal order.27 These acts included
both levying war against the king and compassing his death. As
society developed and political currents shifted, so too did the
concept of treason as a breach of faith, not of the king, but of an
impersonal or abstract conception of the state.28 The legal
rationale of the Roundheads to try King Charles I for treason in
1649 was based on this shift in the concept of treason.
The original hierarchical feudal society was gradually
replaced by a complex, diversified mercantile society, in which
states were based on national lines, although kings were usually
the rulers. When the American colonies achieved their
independence from the British Crown in 1776, they needed a
unifying theory to replace their former allegiance to King George
III.
Fortunately, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
articulated such a theory in the form of a social contract. In 1680,
Robert Filmer claimed that political sovereignty originated with
God and was transmitted by primogeniture through succeeding
generations. The Glorious Revolution of 1688 put an end to such
notions; yet, there was still no systematic explanation as to why
humans formed civil society until 1690 when John Locke
published his TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.29 Essentially,
Locke held that humans voluntarily consented with others to
“make one body politic,” and by doing so, put themselves “under
an obligation to every one of that society to submit to the
determination of the majority.”30 Locke’s concept of a social
contract as the foundation of civil society was in tune with the
prevailing political notions then prevalent in England. His ideas

4 Halsbury’s Statutes of England 273.
See id.
D. ALAN ORR, TREASON AND THE STATE: LAW, POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY
IN THE ENGLISH CIVIL WAR (2002). The complex politics of the English Civil
War aside, Orr’s explanation of the underlying and shifting ideological and
legal concepts is both comprehensive and masterful. See id.
29. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATIES OF GOVERNMENT (Ernest Rhys ed., J.M.
Dent & Sons, Ltd. last rprt. 1943) (1690).
30. Id. at 165.
26.
27.
28.
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were also extremely influential in the American Revolution and
later in the Constitutional Convention of 1787.31
The United States Constitution expresses the concept of a
social contract in its Preamble with the opening phrase, “We the
People . . . .”32 This phrase unequivocally states that the people,
that is, American society at large, created the federal government
for certain specified purposes. One purpose is to establish justice;
that is, to secure the rights of the people by a judicial system to
settle disputes. These rights include personal rights and the right
to hold property.33 In this way, the Constitution is an expression
of the abstract social concept as reduced to written form for the
sole purpose of establishing an organic, fundamental law for the
governance of the United States. Today, this has transcended into
a modern state or body politic wholly divorced from a ruling
monarch and rests on the consent of the governed. For this
reason, a betrayal of the United States by an act of treason is
tantamount to a betrayal of all the people, because it threatens
31.
The concept of humans living in a state of nature and then coming
together to form a civil society was not original for Locke. He was indebted to
RICHARD HOOKER’S LAWS OF ECCLESIASTICAL POLITY (1594) for the notions of a
state of nature and the formation of civil society. Locke was by no means the
only person who wrote about the social contract in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. Thomas Hobbes, Jean Jacques Rousseau, Samuel von
Pufendorf and many others contributed variations on this theme. The
Founding Fathers in 1787 were well-educated men who were keenly aware of
those various intellectual currents. Of the fifty-five delegates to the 1787
Constitutional Convention, twenty-nine held undergraduate degrees, twelve
had done some form of postgraduate study, six had completed their law
studies at London’s Inns of Court and three held degrees from Oxford, St.
Andrews and Glasgow Universities. RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN, HONEST MEN:
THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 65–66 (2009). TREVOR
COLBOURN, THE LAMP OF EXPERIENCE: WHIG HISTORY AND THE INTELLECTUAL
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (Liberty Fund 1998) (1965) has
catalogued the contents of their libraries. For a discussion of
how
rationalism and the Enlightenment relate to natural law see HEINRICH A.
ROMMEN, THE NATURAL LAW: A STUDY IN LEGAL AND SOCIAL HISTORY AND
PHILOSOPHY 67–96 (Thomas R. Hanley trans., Liberty Fund 1998) (1936).
32.
U.S. CONST. pmbl.
33.
The entire Preamble reads, “WE THE PEOPLE of the United States,
in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic
tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare,
and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain
and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.” Id. See
also NICHOLAS PHILLIPSON, ADAM SMITH: AN ENLIGHTENED LIFE 110 (2010), for
Adam Smith’s unpublished Edinburgh lectures on jurisprudence.
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their security. James Wilson, the presumed author of the
Constitution’s treason clause, described treason in a law lecture in
1790 as “unquestionably [the] crime most dangerous to the
society, and most repugnant to the first principles of the social
compact.”34 Justice Bradley succinctly said, “[n]o crime is greater
than treason.”35 Simply put, “[a] traitor’s offense is that he
conspires against the liberty of his fellow countrymen to choose
their way of life.”36
To constitute treason under the Constitution, an act does not
need to be performed in furtherance of the interests of another
state.37 Rather, all that is required is that the act amount to a
levy of war against the United States or an adherence to its
enemies by giving them aid and comfort.38 The Constitution
focuses on the act itself, and is not concerned with whether or not
the act is designed to further the interests of a foreign state.39
The first treason cases under the Constitution did not involve
foreign states, but they did involve armed resistance to the
authority of the federal government, which was construed as
levying war against the United States.40 Prosecutions for treason,
therefore, are a matter of justified self-preservation for the United
States, that is the body politic or the state identified by the phrase
34.
James Wilson (1742–1798), a member of the Constitutional
Convention of 1787, made this statement in his law lecture “Of Crimes
Against the Community.” 2 JAMES WILSON, Of Crimes, Immediately Against
the Community, in COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 1149, 1149 (Kermit
L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., Liberty Fund, Inc. 2007). Wilson was one of
six men who signed both the Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution. President Washington appointed him to the first United States
Supreme Court. James Willard Hurst strongly suggests that Wilson, as a
member of the Committee of Detail, was the most likely the author of the
treason clause. See Willard Hurst, Treason in the United States: The
Constitution, 58 HARV. L. REV. 395, 404–05 (1945).
35. Hanauer v. Doane, 79 U.S. 342, 347 (1870).
36. REBECCA WEST, THE NEW MEANING OF TREASON 370 (1964).
37. See Captain Jabez W. Loane, IV, Treason and Aiding the Enemy, 30
MIL. L. REV. 43, 57–58 (1965).
38. The U.S. Constitution defines treason as: “Treason against the
United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering
to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted
of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act,
or on Confession in open Court.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1.
39. See Loane, supra note 37, at 58.
40. See United States v. Vigol, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 346 (1795); United States
v. Fries, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 515 (1799).
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“We the People” and created by the Constitution.41 For these
reasons, acts involving levying war or adhering to national
enemies, which rise to the level of treason under the Constitution,
properly remain crimes punishable as treason, even in the twentyfirst century, although contemporary circumstances were hardly
contemplated by the Founding Fathers.
In World War II, the enemies of the United States were other
states and were clearly identified by formal declarations of war.
Germany and Japan levied war against the United States with
forces armed and arrayed in a military manner. During the Cold
War, the identified enemy was another state, the Soviet Union,
although there was no formal declaration of war, or even a direct
military conflict. There were numerous indictments of treason
during World War II, but no one was indicted for treason as a
result of aiding the Soviet Union, not even the Rosenbergs who
spied for the Russians during wartime, even though the court
referred to them as traitors. They were tried, convicted, and
executed under the Espionage Act.42
So far in the twenty-first century conflict has been markedly
different. The so-called “war against terror” has been waged
against the United States not by a state but by non-state actors,
whose forces are seldom armed and arrayed in a traditional
military manner. The “enemy” has been small groups of men,
women and even children, who have detonated bombs in crowded
areas abroad or have attempted or actually committed other acts
of violence at home.43 Indeed, the “enemy” may be anyone,
41. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
42. See United States v. Rosenberg, 109 F. Supp. 108, 110 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff’d, 204 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1953). On a motion for reduced death sentences,
the defendants, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, sought judicial review of their
convictions. Id. The Rosenbergs were dedicated communist spies who,
during World War II, turned over documents and other information relating
to nuclear weapons to the Soviet Union. See id. The trial court referred
obliquely to the social contract, “[t]he murderer kills only his victim while the
traitor violates all the members of his society, all the members of the group to
which he owes his allegiance.” Id. Prior to this motion, the Rosenbergs’
convictions were consistently upheld. See United States v. Rosenberg, 195
F.2d 583 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838, and rehearing denied, 344 U.S.
889 (1952). See also Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1 (1945), which was
the leading treason case during World War II.
43. See, e.g., Bryan Denson, FBI thwarts terrorist bombing attempt at
Portland holiday tree lighting, authorities say, OREGONLIVE (Nov. 29, 2010,
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including residents and even citizens of the United States. At
home the “enemy” frequently has remained quiet, and has been
covert until some form of action has been taken, thus making
difficult their identification before they have acted.
These
changed circumstances have led to extensive legislation that
applies to acts which may be motivated by a treasonous intent,
but do not fall within the Constitutional definition of treason.44
Do these changed circumstances and the enactment of new
legislation mean that treason is now an outmoded legal concept,
and that other statutes have superseded treason as an
appropriate legal weapon?45 On the contrary, if a person owing
allegiance to the United States because he or she is a citizen or a
non-citizen resident commits an act falling within the
constitutional definition of treason, that person has committed
treason, regardless of whether or not other charges could be
preferred. The reason is clear: that person has breached the
underlying social contract. Whether or not the Attorney General
seeks an indictment for treason is within his or her discretion, and
will depend on a plethora of other factors, including, but not
limited to political if not electoral considerations. But the fact
remains that treason, as defined in the Constitution, remains a
violation of the social contract, and the perpetrator should be
charged with treason, along with any other appropriate charges.46

1:07 PM), http://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/2010/11/fbi_thwarts_
terrorist_bombing.html.
44. Chapter 115 of Title 18 of the United States Code not only contains
the treason statute (§ 2381), but also misprision of treason (§ 2382), rebellion
or insurrection (§ 2383), seditious conspiracy (§ 2384) and advocating
overthrow of government (§ 2385). 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2381–2385 (Westlaw
through Pub. L. No. 115-51). Additionally, 18 U.S.C. § 2332a applies to the
use of weapons of mass destruction, specifically, against a national of the
United States, or within the United States, and § 2332b applies to acts of
terrorism transcending national boundaries. Id. § 2332a–2332b. The
defendants in the World Trade Center bombing in 1993 were convicted of
seditious conspiracy, a violation of § 2384. Id. § 2384. The convictions were
affirmed in United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 160 (2d Cir. 1999).
45. See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, Ambivalence About Treason, 82 N.C. L.
REV. 1611 (2004) (arguing that treason is indeed an outmoded concept). See
Kristen E. Eichensehr, Treason in the Age of Terrorism: An Explanation and
Evaluation of Treason’s Return in Democratic States, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 1443 (2009), for a capable and compelling refutation.
46. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1.
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II. THE TREASON CLAUSE AND ITS ORIGINS

It is no accident that treason is the only crime defined in the
Constitution, and that it is strictly defined.47 The Founders were
aware of the English experience, and they had two objectives in
mind. First, they defined treason strictly by limiting it to only two
specific acts of betrayal: levying war against the United States
and adhering to its enemies by giving them aid and comfort.48
Secondly, by strictly defining treason in the Constitution, they
prevented Congress and the courts from expanding its definition
either by legislation or by judicial interpretation.49
The Continental Congress was concerned with treason even
before independence was declared in 1776. In June of that year, a
month before American Independence was declared, the thirteen
American colonies were at least nominally part of the British
Empire, and George III was still their king. However, in that
month the Continental Congress, in anticipation of independence,
recognized that popular support would be necessary to the longterm survival of the independent colonies. Congress was keenly
aware that many residents opposed independence, and that these
people would remain loyal to the Crown. These loyalists could
pose a threat to American independence.
Congress appointed a committee to look into assuring the
colonists’ allegiance to the soon-to-be independent colonies.50 This
47. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1 is very specific: “Treason against the
United States shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering
to their enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted
of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act,
or on Confession in open Court.” Id. In § 3, cl. 2, the Founders authorized
Congress to prescribe the punishment for treason, but specifically limited the
punishment of corruption of blood to the life of the defendant. Also, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 deprives Congress of the power to enact a bill of
attainder. Both of these constitutional provisions are significant and
deliberate departures from the English law. Later in 1791, U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII forbid “cruel and unusual punishment,” presumably a rejection
of the English punishment of hanging, drawing, and quartering traitors.
48. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1.
49. See id.
50. See James Willard Hurst, Treason in the United States: I. Treason
Down to the Constitution, 58 HARV. L. REV. 226, 247 (1944). This article is
the first of a series of three articles that comprise an authoritative, if not
magisterial, review and analysis of the law of treason in the United States
from the earliest settlements to 1944. They were later collected and
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committee included James Wilson, John Adams, Thomas
Jefferson, John Rutledge, and Robert Livingston, who reported
back to Congress even before the Declaration of Independence was
signed. Their report acknowledged the imminent creation of new
political entities and urged the states to enact laws providing for
the punishment of treason, that is disloyalty to the soon to be
independent states. The Continental Congress adopted it on June
24, 1776.
The resolution adopting the report echoed the Statute of 25
Edward III, which was well known to the committee, and
contained the traditional elements of treason.51 First, it recited
the reciprocal duties of individuals and then stated, “all persons
abiding within any of the United Colonies, and deriving protection
from the laws of the same, owe allegiance to the said laws.”52 It
continued by specifying the two major acts of treason later
embodied in the Constitution: “all persons, . . . owing allegiance to
any of the United Colonies, . . . who shall levy war against” any of
them “or be adherent to the king of Great Britain, or others the
enemies of the said colonies, . . . are guilty of treason against such
colony.”53
Six months after independence, Pennsylvania enacted a
comprehensive treason statute on February 11, 1777.54 This
statute is important because it illustrates the then prevailing
concept of treason, most of which was deliberately omitted from
the Constitutional definition drafted in 1787.55 The statute
minces no words. The preamble recognizes the Tory threat to the
newly independent state of Pennsylvania and recites the necessity
“for the safety of every state to prevent . . . treasonable and
dangerous practices” by “internal enemies.”56 The purpose of the
statute was deterrence of “all persons from the perpetration of
published as THE LAW OF TREASON IN THE UNITED STATES in 1971 by the
Greenwood Publishing Company.
51. Treason Act, 1351, 25 Edw. 3, c. 2 (Eng.).
52. 5 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789, at 475
(Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1906) (1776).
53. Id.
54. Law of Feb. 11, 1777, ch. DCCXL, 1777 Penn. Laws 45 (repealed
1860).
55. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
56. Law of Feb. 11, 1777, ch. DCCXL, § I, 1777 Penn. Laws 45, 45
(repealed 1860).
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such horrid and dangerous crimes.”57
Its scope was broad and inclusive. It applied to everyone “now
inhabiting, residing or sojourning” in Pennsylvania, and to
everyone in the future who voluntarily comes into the state to
“inhabit, reside or sojourn.”58 The statute with the concept that it
was the state’s duty to provide protection to persons within the
state, whether or not they were citizens, and the reciprocal duty of
those persons to refrain from betraying the state by committing
certain specified acts, was firmly grounded in what was generally
understood to be the law of treason.59
The Pennsylvania statute proscribed six categories of overt
acts: (1) accepting “commissions from the King of Great Britain,”
or other enemies; (2) “levy[ing] war against the state or
government”; (3) providing “aid or assistance” to “any enemies at
open war against this state, or the United States of America”; (4)
“carrying on a traitorous correspondence with them”; (5) forming a
“conspiracy for betraying this state or the United States of
America”; and (6) “giv[ing] or send[ing] any intelligence to the
enemies of this state for that purpose.”60
The statute included a procedural safeguard by specifically
requiring “two sufficient witnesses” for a conviction, but it was
silent as to whether these two witnesses must testify to the same
overt act.61 Conviction carried with it the death penalty and a
forfeiture of the traitor’s estate to the commonwealth. However,
the trial judges could modify the forfeiture to provide for the
support of the traitor’s wife and children.62
57. Id.
58. Id. § II.
59. At the time of the Constitutional Convention a widely read and
leading authority on criminal law was Sir Matthew Hale’s History of the
Pleas of the Crown. MATTHEW HALE, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONAE: THE
HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 59–100 (London, In the Savory: Printed
by E. and R. Nutt, and R. Gosling for F. Gyles, T. Woodward, and C.
Davis 1736). James Wilson and the other lawyers in the convention as well
as many educated persons were familiar with it and by inference with the
discussion of treason. I am grateful to the staff of the Redwood Library and
Athenaeum in Newport for access to the 1736 edition of this work, which is
part of its original collection.
60. Law of Feb. 11, 1777, ch. DCCXL, § III, 1777 Penn. Laws 45, 45–46
(repealed 1860).
61. Id. at 46.
62. Id.
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It was not long before the Pennsylvania treason statute was
enforced with a vengeance. The British had occupied Philadelphia
in late 1777, a few months after the statute had been enacted, and
remained there until June 1778.63 After the British left
Philadelphia, it was time to confront all those persons who were
even remotely suspected of cooperating with the British occupiers.
Quakers were particularly suspect because of their refusal on
religious grounds to bear arms for either side. In addition, a
radical party was in control of the state, and brought numerous
treason charges against their real or supposed enemies with a
great deal of relish.
James Wilson64 defended twenty-three men who were
charged with treason, twenty-one of whom were acquitted.65 Only
Abraham Carlisle66 and John Roberts67 were convicted and soon
afterwards were hanged.68
Carlisle was an elderly and prosperous carpenter. He was
also a Quaker. During the British occupation he had served in
some capacity at a gate to the city. At the very least, he had been
a civilian employee of the British. However, he was charged with
taking a commission from the British. Despite Wilson’s best
efforts in pointing out that no commission was ever proven,
Carlisle was nevertheless convicted of taking a commission from
the British.
John Roberts, like Carlisle, was also a Quaker. He was a
miller in Lower Merion and father of nine children. The state’s
witnesses generally testified to Roberts’ sympathies for the British
63. Id. at 47. Note that this was approximately the same time that
General Washington and the Continental Army wintered at Valley Forge.
64. Robert Aitken, James Wilson: A Lost American Founder, 29 LITIG.
61, 61–62, 64 (Summer 2003). Wilson was born in Scotland and emigrated to
Pennsylvania in 1763. He read law under John Dickinson and later became
an eminent Philadelphia lawyer. By this time, he was well known in
Philadelphia, not only as an extremely competent lawyer, but also as having
little sympathy with the radical party that controlled Pennsylvania, and
particularly Philadelphia. Id.
65. Id. at 64.
66. Respublica v. Abraham Carlisle, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 35 (1778).
67. Respublica v. John Roberts, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 39 (1778).
68. The account of the Carlisle and Roberts trials is based on both the
reported cases and CHARLES PAGE SMITH, JAMES WILSON: FOUNDING FATHER,
1742–1798, at 117–122 (1956), a good biography with an excellent account of
the Philadelphia treason trials of 1778.
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and his oral statements to that effect. The state sought to
introduce Roberts’ “confession.” Wilson strenuously objected on
grounds that a Pennsylvania statute specifically forbade the use of
a confession as evidence in such matters. He was overruled, and
Roberts was convicted. Death by hanging and forfeiture of his
property were the penalties.
The judges and the juries at the trials of Carlisle and Roberts
performed their respective duties under the law. Remarkably,
both the judges and the jurors pleaded for clemency for both men
in petitions to the Supreme Executive Council of Pennsylvania,
which alone had the power to commute the sentences.69 More
than 1,500 other people in Philadelphia and its environs signed
numerous other petitions for clemency.70 The blood lust of a
significant portion of the populace could only be satisfied by
hanging Carlisle and Roberts. Presumably, political expediency
explains the denial of these petitions. This realization may also
explain why later juries acquitted all remaining defendants.71
The Carlisle and Roberts trials are no longer remembered.
But what must have been a searing experience made a lasting
impression on James Wilson. Nine years later, in 1787, he had
the opportunity as a member of the Constitutional Convention to
influence the definition of treason, the only crime set forth in the
Constitution.72 He was well aware of the extraordinary passions
that could be aroused by just the suspicion of treason; he had seen
what happened with the introduction of Robert’s out of court
confession; he knew the breadth of the Pennsylvania statute, and
the imprecision of its language. Even so, there would always be
threats from one source or another, and citizens and residents
could be tempted to betray the country. The question was how
much restraint was required to satisfy the justifiable need for

69. Id. at 122.
70. 7 SAMUEL HAZARD, PENNSYLVANIA ARCHIVES, 26–37 (1853).
71. See Carlton F.W. Larson, The Revolutionary American Jury: A Case
Study of the 1778–1779 Philadelphia Treason Trials, 61 SMU L. REV. 1441,
1493, 1496–97 (2008). The juries were faced with a cruel dilemma. Under
the law, they could either acquit or convict; there was no lesser offense. If
they convicted, a pardon was not likely as the Carlisle and Roberts cases
showed. This may be one explanation for the remaining acquittals.
72. Wilson is widely believed to be the author of this provision. See
Hurst, supra note 34, at 404.
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security. The events in Philadelphia, in the autumn of 1778, led
Wilson to his views on the law of treason, which were later
embodied in the Constitution, and which he explained in his law
lectures.
In his famous law lectures of 1790, James Wilson provided an
early explanation of why treason was strictly defined in the
Constitution: “Treason against the United States, shall consist
only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies,
giving them Aid and Comfort.”73 In addition to the strict
definition of treason, the Constitution includes the procedural
safeguards of requiring two witnesses to the same overt act and
excluding out of court confessions.74 Wilson and other members of
the convention were acutely aware of the English experience with
the use and abuse of treason. For example, he noted that in the
reign of Henry VIII the “malignant spirit of inventing treasons
revived” and produced the absurd result that the king’s physicians
refused to inform their patient that his condition was terminal,
lest they be charged with treason for predicting the king’s death.75
By defining treason in the Constitution, both Congress and the
courts were precluded from “inventing” new treasons.
In these law lectures, Wilson drew on the experience of
several centuries of English history and established two criteria
for the law of treason: it should be “determinate” and it should be
“stable.”76 These criteria were necessary to avoid the abusive use
of treason that had occurred in England, and which were well
known to the drafters of the Constitution. The prime example is
the treason trial of Sir Walter Raleigh in 1603, which was based
on insufficient evidence at best. The real motivation behind the
trial was political intrigue at the court of James I.77
73. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
74. Id.
75. WILSON, supra note 34, at 1151.
76. Id. at 1149. The lectures were given at the College of Philadelphia
(later the University of Pennsylvania) to a distinguished audience, which
included the President, Mrs. Washington and Vice-President John Adams,
among other luminaries. Larson, supra note 71, at 1442. The University of
Pennsylvania School of Law traces its origin to these lectures and claims
Wilson as its founder.
77. See CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE: THE LIFE
AND TIMES OF SIR EDWARD COKE, 1552–1634, at 190–217 (Little, Brown & Co.
1990) (1957), for a scholarly, but exceptionally well-written account of the
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The constitutional definition of treason is determinate
because it clearly specifies that it “shall consist only in levying
War” or “in adhering to their Enemies” and nothing else.78 It is
also stable because it is defined in the Constitution, and for that
reason Congress lacks the power to define it. As
Wilson
explained, the citizens are “secured effectually from even
legislative tyranny.”79 Even though the Constitution prevents
Congress from expanding the definition of treason by labeling
other acts as treason, Congress may decide that other acts that
could have been reasonably considered treasonous are felonies,
and provide severe penalties for committing them.80
A strict definition of treason is not a modern idea. It was
embodied in the treason statute of 1352, generally known as the
Statute of 25 Edward III.81 This statute was remedial.82 No
longer could acts which otherwise were legitimate political dissent
be treason. It clearly stated what acts constituted treason in the
context of a medieval society.83 Only those acts specifically
enumerated in the statute were treasonous.84 Even though it was
enacted under conditions very different from those found in
succeeding generations, this statute is the generally accepted
bedrock of the law of treason. Its basic concept of enforcing loyalty
to the king has been transferred easily to the American republic.
Indeed, the phrase “levying war” in the Constitution was taken
directly from this statute.85
After defining specific acts of treason, the statute provided
trial.
78. U.S. CONST. art III, § 3, cl.1.
79. WILSON, supra note 34, at 1152.
80. See Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 45 (1945).
81. See id. at 16 & n.22. The statute is fundamental to the English and
later American law of treason. In the seventeenth century, Sir Edward Coke
started his discussion of treason in the Third Part of the Institutes. 2 SIR
EDWARD COKE, The Third Part of the Institutes: Cap. I. Of High Treason,
reprinted in THE SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE 952
(Steve Sheppard ed., Liberty Fund, Inc. 2003). In the twentieth century, Sir
William Holdsworth discussed it and its application in A History of English
Law. 3 SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 287–293
(Methuen & Co. Ltd. 3d ed. 1923).
82. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 81, at 287.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 291.
85. U.S. CONST. art III, §3, cl. 1.
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that if a fact pattern of presumed treason arises, the judge hearing
the matter “shall not go to judgment in such cases; but shall tarry”
until the king or parliament determines whether or not it should
be considered treason or another felony.86 This provision was an
early attempt at strict construction of the statute so as to limit the
number of acts that would be treasonous. It did not succeed.
English law is replete with examples of constructive treasons,
which expanded the scope of the offense significantly by judicial
decision.87 The Constitutional definition four and a half centuries
later is a more recent and a more successful limitation.88 Unlike
the Statute of 25 Edward III, the Constitution also includes the
procedural safeguards of two witnesses to the same overt act, and
excludes out of court confessions, thus making prosecution of
treason more difficult than prosecution for other criminal acts.89
The Statute of 25 Edward III was based on the notion that
treason is a betrayal of the duty of loyalty a person owes to his
sovereign king.90 Historically, the sovereign was the king, but in
republics, the sovereign is the political entity of a country.
Clearly, citizens may commit treason against their sovereign,
whoever or whatever it may be. There is a reciprocal relationship
between the sovereign who provides protection to the citizen, and
to the non-citizen resident alike, in exchange for a degree of
loyalty, or at least the absence of betrayal in the form of outright
rebellion or subversion. For this reason, Wilson concludes that an
alien or a non-citizen may commit treason in the country in which
he resides, as well as citizens of that country.91
In explaining “levying war” Wilson warms to his subject by
describing it as persons “arrayed in a warlike manner,” and
specifying an assembly “in great numbers, armed with offensive
weapons, or weapons of war, if they march thus armed in a body”
with commanders or officers, and “with banners displayed, or with

86. WILSON, supra note 34, at 1150.
87. 8 SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 307–322
(Methuen & Co. Ltd. 1925).
88. U.S. CONST. art III, § 3, cl. 1.
89. See id.
90. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 81, at 287.
91. WILSON, supra note 34, at 1153. The point appears to be well settled.
See Carlisle v. United States, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 147, 154 (1872); United
States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 97 (1820).
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drums or trumpets.”92 The important point is that the assembly
of persons must be organized for war, not that war must be
actually waged. Wilson describes levying war in the manner of
the eighteenth century: “arrayed in a warlike manner.”93
However, he only alluded to the necessity of a treasonous intent of
the principals, which by definition, and later court decisions, is
required to levy war against the United States.
Unfortunately, Wilson devotes scant attention to the other
prong of treason—adhering to the enemy. He explains this phrase
with the constitutional words “giving them aid and comfort” which
apparently ends the discussion as far as he is concerned.94
However, he does provide a few classic examples, such as giving
intelligence, sending provisions and selling arms “to enemies of
the United States.”95 All of these examples involve providing
some form of aid or comfort to an enemy and thus they follow the
constitutional definition.96 His analysis is spotty, presumably
because he considered the means of providing “aid and comfort” to
be self-explanatory.97
Wilson’s analysis identifies who may commit treason and
explains the meaning of the phrases “levying war” and “adhering
to enemies.”98 Anyone who has enjoyed the protection of the
United States can commit treason because there are reciprocal
duties of the nation to protect its citizens and lawful residents,
and of those same people, to refrain from levying war against the
United States or adhering to her enemies.99
Wilson’s description of treason is simple and by today’s
standards it could be called simplistic. But, his lecture was not
intended to be a detailed analysis of treason. Nevertheless, it is
accurate as far as it goes, and in that sense, he succeeded
admirably. However, any chance to apply Wilson’s analysis would
have to wait for later judicial decisions in specific instances.
92. WILSON, supra note 34, at 1153–54.
93. Id. at 1153.
94. Id. at 1155.
95. Id.
96. WILSON, supra note 34, at 1155.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1153.
99. Id.; see Carlisle v. United States, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 147, 154 (1872);
see United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 97 (1820).
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Early decisions were presented with the factual question of
what precisely constitutes “levying war.” Later in the twentieth
century, courts were concerned with what is required to render
“aid and comfort” to an enemy. Regardless of the factual
questions of the case, all treason cases were concerned with intent
one way or the other, because if there was no treasonous intent,
there was no treason despite the consequences of a particular
act.100 In 1795, the new federal government was faced with an
insurrection. Was it treason?
III. THE FIRST CHALLENGES: LEVYING WAR

The first treason cases under the new Constitution did not
involve betrayal to foreign powers. Instead, they involved
domestic quasi-military opposition to acts of Congress. These
cases were mainly concerned with specifying what acts are
required to levy war against the United States. In most cases,
intent was inferred from the acts themselves. As a rule, in the
early cases, the second prong of treason—adhering to the enemy—
was not charged.
Soon after the new federal government was established, it
levied a tax on whiskey distilleries as part of a broader financial
plan.101 Western Pennsylvania was the scene of opposition to the
tax, and in 1794, the opposition became violent.102 Rallies fanned
the flames of opposition, which spilled over into an attack on the
home of John Neville, the tax collector, and resulted in his home
being destroyed by fire.103 The federal government responded by
calling for the muster of large militia forces, and even President
Washington went to Carlisle to inspect them.104 Suspects were
rounded up and taken to Philadelphia for trial.105
Prosecutors sent thirty-five bills for treason to the grand jury,
100. See Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 31 (1945). In his third
installment of his article, Hurst maintains that treason requires a specific
intent. Willard Hurst, Treason in the United States: Under the Constitution,
58 HARV. L. REV. 806, 815 (1945).
101. BRADLEY CHAPIN, Constitutional Definition, in THE AMERICAN LAW OF
TREASON: REVOLUTIONARY AND EARLY NATIONAL ORIGINS 85–90 (Univ. of
Wash. Press 1964).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 87.
105. Id.
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which, to the credit of their independence and good sense,
endorsed eleven of them “ignoramus.”106 Of the remaining twentyfour men who were indicted, thirteen had already fled.107 Philip
Vigol108 and John Mitchell109 were tried and convicted. In both
cases, the issue was essentially whether the acts complained of
were a riot or an insurrection. The defense was that a charge of
treason did not lie because the acts did not constitute treason.
The court focused first on the object of the “insurrection.”110
It held that because the object of the acts was “to suppress the
excise offices, and to prevent the execution of an act of Congress,
by force and intimidation” it was High Treason, “an usurpation of
the authority of government . . . by levying war.”111 The Court
then reviewed the evidence and found that the participants were
“arrayed in a military manner; they affected the military forms of
negotiation by a flag” and they demanded that John Neville
surrender his commission.112 On the basis of these facts “the
object of the insurrection was of a general and public nature.”113
With a lack of thoroughness and subtlety in its analysis, the
Court stated that the treasonous intent could be inferred from the
purpose of the “insurrection” as well as the overt acts
committed.114 Despite the flagrance of the acts and the burning of
John Neville’s house, there was no evidence of an intent to betray
the United States.115 Nevertheless, the Court found the requisite
intent in the acts of Mitchell and Vigol which converted those acts
from mere riot to treason.116 The defense correctly argued, but to
no avail, that the charge was a constructive treason, which was
well known in English law, but specifically excluded from the
constitutional definition of treason.117 President Washington
106. CHAPIN, supra note 101, at 87. “Ignoramus” meaning “we do not
know.” The jury found the evidence insufficient for a true bill.
107. Id.
108. See United States v. Vigol, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 346 (1795).
109. See United States v. Mitchell, 2 U.S. 348 (1795).
110. Id. at 348–49.
111. Id. at 355.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. United States v. Vigol, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 346, 346–47 (1795).
115. Mitchell, 2 U.S. at 352–53.
116. Id. at 349–50; Vigol, 2 U.S. at 346–47.
117. Mitchell, 2 U.S. at 350; Vigol, 2 U.S. at 347.
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pardoned both Mitchell and Vigol as well as the other men who
had been indicted.
In 1798 there was another vigorous, if not particularly
violent, protest against a federal excise tax.118 This time it was in
eastern Pennsylvania.119 Great trouble arose after the U.S.
Marshal arrested several men who had resisted paying the tax.120
He sequestered his prisoners in a tavern in Bethlehem for
safekeeping.121 A federal posse then surrounded the tavern to
prevent their rescue by John Fries, the leader of a motley group of
armed men bent on releasing the arrested men by any means
possible.122 After a brief standoff, the U.S. Marshal agreed to
release his prisoners on their promise to surrender to federal
authorities in Philadelphia.123 Fries and his men had succeeded.
No shots had been fired and no one had even been injured, let
alone killed.124
Despite the lack of overt violence—although it was certainly a
possibility, which thankfully was averted—Fries was tried for
treason in 1799 on the grounds that he had levied war against the
United States by leading an armed band of men in military array
against the marshal, specifically to prevent the collection of the
excise tax imposed pursuant to an act of Congress. In this sense,
his acts were similar to those of Mitchell and Vigol a few years
before in the Whiskey Rebellion.
Fries was tried twice. His first trial resulted in his conviction,
but his motion for a new trial was granted on grounds of the
possible bias of a juror.125 In April 1800, Fries was convicted a
118. CHAPIN, supra note 101, at 90.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 91.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 92.
124. Id. at 92; United States v. Fries, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 515 (1799); see
generally W.W.H. DAVIS, THE FRIES REBELLION 1798–99 (Doylestown Pub. Co.
1899).
125. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the second Fries trial was the
withdrawal of defense counsel. In the first trial, the defense had argued that
armed opposition to enforcement of federal laws was not treason. Before the
second trial started, Justice Samuel Chase, sitting as a Circuit judge,
distributed to defense counsel and others his conclusion in writing that such
opposition was treason, ostensibly in order to shorten the length of the trial.
At that time, juries were allowed to make findings of law. Thus, Chase not
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second time and was sentenced to hang. The matter did not end
there. It had become embroiled in the political struggle between
the Federalist administration of John Adams and Jefferson’s
Republicans who opposed the excise tax and leapt to the defense of
the man who had acted against its collection.
President Adams’ cabinet was delighted with the verdict and
the sentence. They thought it necessary to show the Jeffersonian
Republicans that they could not foment disruption of national
laws with impunity. They strongly advised Adams to deny Fries’
petition for pardon. A horrible example was a public necessity,
they maintained.126 Adams gave deep and thorough consideration
to the pardon and to the opinions of his cabinet, but after much
thought, he disregarded partisan politics and pardoned Fries just
as Washington had pardoned the participants in the Whiskey
Rebellion.127
In both the Fries case and the Whiskey Rebellion cases, a
charge of treason was used to defend the authority of the federal
government in a matter that was exclusively internal. No foreign
power was involved and it was never even suggested that the
defendants had betrayed the United States in favor of its enemies
either by levying war or by adhering to them by giving them aid
and comfort. At the most, all that the defendants had done was
take up arms against a hated act of Congress. While their acts
may have technically amounted to treason, the threat to the
country was limited and local. Treason charges may have been
appropriate, but the leaders’ convictions stressed the point that
acts of Congress had to be obeyed. Both Washington and Adams

only deprived the defense of its major argument, he also invaded the province
of the jury. After defense counsel had withdrawn, no successor defense
counsel was appointed. Chase stated he would protect the rights of the
defendant. Chase’s unusual act was a godsend to Jefferson and the
Republicans in their attempt to cleanse the federal bench of Federalist
judges. It was one of the reasons Chase was impeached, but not removed
from the bench. He has the dubious distinction of being the only Supreme
Court Justice ever to be impeached. CHAPIN, supra note 101, at 93–95. See
LEONARD BAKER, JOHN MARSHALL: A LIFE IN LAW 420–38 (Macmillan Pub. Co.,
Inc. 1974), for a concise and informative account of the impeachment trial of
Justice Chase.
126. CHAPIN, supra note 101, at 96; see also PAGE SMITH, JOHN ADAMS,
1784–1826, at 1007 (Doubleday & Co., Inc. 1962).
127. SMITH, supra note 126, at 1033–34.
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rose above domestic politics and wisely concluded that conciliation
was more important than hanging the defendants.
Not all incidents involving armed resistance to the
enforcement of national law rise to the level of levying war against
the United States in the constitutional sense. In 1808, Frederick
Hoxie was hired to deliver a raft loaded with timber on Lake
Champlain from Vermont into Canada. He would be paid $800
only upon a successful completion of his mission, but the federal
embargo laws prohibited the transaction. These laws were key to
the Jefferson administration’s policy to keep the United States out
of the European war then raging. A federal official in Vermont
attempted to enforce the embargo laws, which were detested in
New England as much as the excise taxes had been detested in
Pennsylvania. He seized the raft at Isle La Motte near the
Canadian border. A United States trooper guarded the raft after
its seizure until Hoxie, with about sixty men armed with muskets
and clubs, forcibly re-took it and moved it northwards towards
Canada. About an hour later, federal troops opened fire on the
raft. Hoxie and the men on the raft returned the fire. Although
the firing was in earnest on both sides, no one was even injured,
let alone killed.128 The Jefferson administration was anxious for
policy reasons to enforce the embargo laws by all means possible.
They charged Hoxie with treason and brought him to trial. The
court all but directed a verdict of acquittal.129 The court based its
conclusion on the sometimes narrow distinction between
insurrection and riot.130 After examining the facts of the case, the
court looked at the object or purpose of the affray and found that it
was of a local or private nature, not having a direct tendency to
destroy all property and all government.131 Moreover, in order to
be considered treason, the intention must be “universal or general,
as to effect some object of a general, public nature” and that
necessary intention was lacking.132
What was the difference between Frederick Hoxie’s efforts to
deliver a raft of timber to Canada in violation of federal law,
which included a shootout with federal forces, John Fries’ acts,
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

United States v. Hoxie, 26 F. Cas. 397 (C.C.D. Vt. 1808) (No. 15,407).
Id.
Id. at 400.
Id. at 402.
Id.
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which involved assembling forces but no shootout, and John
Mitchell’s and Philip Vigol’s armed resistance to the excise laws?
The most obvious difference was in scope and intent: Hoxie sought
only to deliver the timber to Canada so he could be paid for it
despite the embargo, while the others resorted to violence or the
threat of it to prevent the execution of lawful acts of Congress
throughout the country. The court in Hoxie seized upon this
distinction and found that the controversy was a private one, that
Hoxie did not intend to force rescission of the embargo.133
Therefore, Hoxie lacked treasonous intent, despite the exchange of
serious musket fire with federal troops.134 The lack of the
requisite treasonous intent prevented an armed conflict from
being transformed from a riot or an affray into an act of treason by
levying war. The intent, not the act, limited the scope of the
crime.135
The acquittal of Hoxie was undoubtedly the right decision.
He was simply pursuing his own private interests in violation of
the embargo laws. He lacked treasonous intent. The same cannot
be said for Fries and the participants in the Whiskey Rebellion.
Their intent was a “universal intent” to “resist or impede the
operation” of the tax laws as enacted by Congress, which was a
form of betrayal.136 These cases raise the troubling point that the
treason statute of 1790137 was used to enforce acts of Congress in
the Whiskey Rebellion and against John Fries. Hoxie was tried
for treason to make a political point about enforcing the embargo.
Since that time, Congress has enacted statutes more appropriate
to the enforcement of federal authority, thus reserving treason
prosecutions for cases involving betrayal of the United States.138
Forceful opposition in Pennsylvania to lawfully imposed
excise taxes prepared the way for the first two major treason cases
under the Constitution.139 These cases articulated in American
133. Id. at 403.
134. Id. at 402.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112 (1790).
138.
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2381 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-51);
Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 736 (1951); Cramer v. United
States, 325 U.S. 1, 29 (1944).
139.
See Ex Parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch.) 75 (1807); United States v.
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jurisprudence the basic principles of treason by levying war. For
this reason, they merit close examination. These cases arose from
the complex web that Aaron Burr created in 1805 and 1806 and,
like the Pennsylvania cases, involved allegations of levying war
against the United States.140 Burr became involved in mysterious
plots and inchoate plans, possibly to detach the region west of the
Appalachian Mountains from the eastern United States.141
Samuel Swartwout and Erick Bollman were connected in
some way with the Burr plots. They were arrested in New
Orleans, at the time recently purchased by the United States from
France, and sent to Washington to stand trial for treason. The
Supreme Court heard their ex parte motions for habeas corpus
and then discharged the prisoners on the grounds that the facts of
the case would not support a charge of treason.142
The main issue was whether the indictment charged treason.
In order to constitute the crime for which Swartwout and Bollman
were accused, Chief Justice John Marshall held that there must
have been an actual levying of war against the United States. He
distinguished between conspiracy to levy war and the actual
levying of war as two distinct offenses, and noted that a
conspiracy did not rise to the level of treason.143 Marshall
emphasized that “there must be an actual assemblage of men for
the purpose of executing a treasonable design.”144
Drawing on the court’s decision in Fries, Marshall concluded
that “if they proceed to carry such intention into execution by
force, . . . they are guilty of the treason of levying war; and the
quantum of the force employed neither lessens nor increases the

Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694).
140.
Burr served as vice-president under Jefferson from 1801 to 1805,
during which time Burr fought the famous duel with Alexander Hamilton
and killed him.
141.
Aaron Burr and his plots, assuming they were plots, are endlessly
fascinating. See CHAPIN, supra note 101, at 98–113, for a good, but brief,
discussion of the legal issues and complicated facts of the case. See BAKER,
supra note 125, at 448–518, for a deeper review of the legal and factual
issues. See J.J. COOMBS, THE TRIAL OF AARON BURR FOR HIGH TREASON (W. H.
& O. H. Morrison 1864), for Burr’s treason trial record. It, too, has its own
fascination.
142.
Bollman, 8 U.S. at 136.
143. Id. at 126.
144. Id. at 127.
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crime.”145 In other words, levying war means an assembly of men
for a treasonous purpose with the intent to achieve their goal by
force. It is still considered treason even if the intended force is not
used, or if it is insufficient to achieve its purpose. All that is
required is that the assembly intends to use some amount of force
and have it at their disposal.
Marshall continued with a celebrated statement, which later
gave him difficulty in the trial of Aaron Burr:
[I]f war be actually levied, that is, if a body of men be
actually assembled for the purpose of effecting by force a
treasonable purpose, all those who perform any part,
however minute, or however remote from the scene of
action, and who are actually leagued in the general
conspiracy, are to be considered as traitors.146
Regardless of this dictum, Marshall’s analysis is consistent
with the criteria Wilson set forth in his law lecture.147 Marshall’s
rule follows the strict definition in the Constitution and is
“determinate” in that it limits treason by levying war to (1) an
assemblage of men, (2) who use force, regardless of its quantum
for (3) a treasonous purpose.148 Marshall’s dictum explaining that
remoteness from the scene of action is not a defense so long as
there is a link between the accused and the “general conspiracy”
appears to cover the situation in which a defendant with the
requisite intent assembles with the main body but does not
actually participate in the use of force.149 But this fact pattern
was not before the Court in Bollman.150
In examining the evidence against Swartwout and Bollman,
the Court held that “[t]he mere enlisting of men, without
assembling them, is not levying war” and “[t]he travelling of
individuals to the place of rendezvous . . . would be an equivocal
act, and has no warlike appearance.”151 However, “[t]he meeting

145. Id. at 128 (quoting Case of Fries, 9 F. Cas. 924, 931 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800)
(No. 5,127)) (emphasis in original).
146. Id. at 126.
147. WILSON, supra note 34, at 1149–56.
148. Bollman, 8 U.S. at 127, 128.
149. See id. at 126.
150. Id. at 135.
151. Id. at 134.
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of particular bodies of men, and their marching from places of
partial to a place of general rendezvous, would be such an
assemblage.”152 Such was not the case with these defendants and,
because no treasonous acts were alleged, the Court discharged
Swartwout and Bollman.153
This ruling clearly distinguished between conspiracy and
plotting, neither of which amounts to treason, and acts of an
assemblage of men in furtherance of the conspiracy or plot, which,
no matter how great or slight, do amount to treason. The
allegations must be fact specific. Using the Constitutional
definition of treason against the United States, which states that
treason “shall consist only in levying War against them, or in
adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort,”154
limits judges from expanding it by construction.
A few months later, Aaron Burr himself was brought to trial
on charges of treason. It is no exaggeration to say that this was
the trial of the nineteenth century.155 The political passions of the
time were extraordinary. Thomas Jefferson, as president, brought
the full weight of the federal government against his former vicepresident.156 Not only was Jefferson bent on destroying Burr, but
he and his party also sought to control the judicial branch as well
as Congress.157 His political aims brought him into conflict with
Chief Justice John Marshall, who favored an independent
judiciary and a strong central government.158 Chief Justice
Marshall sat as a trial judge at Burr’s trial in the Circuit Court for
Virginia, which followed the common procedure at that time in
which Supreme Court justices sat as Circuit Court judges.159
Counsel on both sides were distinguished, extraordinarily
152. Id.
153. Id. at 136.
154. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1.
155. There is extensive literature on the Burr treason trial. See CHAPIN,
supra note 101, at 98–113, for a short, but readable and accurate, account.
See PETER CHARLES HOFFER, THE TREASON TRIALS OF AARON BURR (Univ.
Press of Kan. 2008), for a recent study. The extensive record of the trial may
be found in DAVID ROBERTSON, THE TRIAL OF AARON BURR FOR TREASON
(Hopkins & Earle 1808, 1875) and in COOMBS, supra note 141.
156. CHAPIN, supra note 101, at 100.
157. See BAKER, supra note 125, at 466–518, for a thorough and relatively
brief account of the Burr conspiracy and the trials.
158. Id. at 477.
159. Id. at 455.
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competent lawyers who presented thorough, exhaustive, and
sometimes brilliant arguments.160 No trial has ever been more
politically charged or produced more rancor between the parties
and widespread, outright popular hatred of the defendant.
The fundamental question of law raised by this trial was what
constituted levying war under the Constitution.161 Both sides
agreed that a treasonous intent was necessary. However, the
argument concerned the extent of the overt act.162 The defense
urged that levying war required an actual assemblage of men with
the paraphernalia of war.163 The Government argued that arms
and the application of force were not necessary so long as the
assembled men had a treasonous intent.164 Other important legal
questions were raised, argued at length, and ruled upon. These
legal questions included executive privilege when the defense
subpoenaed Jefferson’s papers, whether the common law applied
in federal courts, and the extent of the guilt of an aider, abettor or
procurer of treason.165
Marshall instructed the jury that levying war required the
use of force or the capability and readiness to use it. He said,
War is an appeal from reason to the sword; and he who
makes the appeal evidences the fact by the use of the
means. His intention to go to war may be proved by
words; but the actual going to war is a fact which is to be
proved by open deed. The end is to be effected by force;
and it would seem that in cases where no declaration is to
be made, the state of actual war could be created by the
employment of force, or being in a condition to employ
it.166
The underlying concept is that a resort to arms indicates that
peaceable means have been discarded in favor of force. Here,
Marshall followed the conclusion of the Whiskey Rebellion cases in
which Mitchell and Vigol actually participated in the use of force,
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 470.
CHAPIN, supra note 101, at 107.
Id. at 107–108.
Id. at 108.
Id.
Id. at 107.
COOMBS, supra note 141, at 315.
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burning John Neville’s house to obtain their goals.167 Although
one might argue that Fries did not use force to obtain the release
of his prisoners, the fact that his men were assembled and arrayed
in a military manner and threatened to use it was consistent with
Marshall’s later analysis.168
In all of these cases the defendants had the requisite
treasonous intent: Mitchell, Vigol, and Fries sought to prevent the
collection of excise taxes and the enforcement of lawful acts of
Congress and they were present at the commission of the overt
acts: the burning of John Neville’s house and surrounding the
tavern, respectively. Burr may well have sought to detach much
of the trans-Appalachian country from the eastern United States,
and thus, had the requisite treasonous intent, based on betrayal.
However, unlike the earlier cases, the government in Burr’s case
admitted Burr was not actually present at the time of the overt
act.169 The result was a procedural victory for the defense, which
soon led to Burr’s acquittal, despite the jury’s expressed
inclination to convict.170
Marshall had identified the elements of levying war. A
generation later in 1842, when Rhode Island was faced with two
governments and an actual civil war, Justice Joseph Story, sitting
as a circuit judge in Rhode Island, elaborated upon, but did not
change, Marshall’s elements in a charge to federal grand jury.171
He identified five separate elements of levying war: (1) an
assembly of persons, (2) met for a treasonous purpose (a general
intent), (3) an overt act with forces to execute or towards
executing a treasonous purpose, (4) a present intent to proceed in
the execution of the treasonous purpose by force (a specific

167. United States v. Mitchell, 2 U.S. 348, 348 (1795); United States v.
Vigol, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 346, 346 (1795).
168. United States v. Fries, 3 U.S. 515 (1799).
169. COOMBS, supra note 141, at 307. The Government argued that even
if he had not been present at the commission of the overt act, he still was an
aider, abettor, or some form of accomplice in the treasonous event. Id. at 324.
However, Marshall correctly held that, because principals in the treason had
not been convicted, an accomplice could not be convicted first. Id. at 347–48.
170. The jury’s original verdict was “not proved to be guilty under this
indictment.” It was soon changed to an outright acquittal. Id. at 352–54.
171. Charge to Grand Jury–Treason, 30 F. Cas. 1046, 1046 (C.C.D. R.I.
1842) (No. 18,275).
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intent).172 He added a fifth element, which was logically implied
in his definition: (5) the capability of the assembly to use that
force.173
Two later Civil War cases followed in the same vein. In
January 1861, an artillery company in Georgia took possession of
Fort Pulaski from the United States “without encountering any
forcible resistance.”174 A member of that company was later
apprehended in Philadelphia and tried for treason.175 Following
Marshall’s holding in United States v. Burr,176 the court defined
the overt act in levying war as: (1) a body of armed men, (2)
mustered in military array, (3) for a treasonous purpose. This
definition is consistent with recognized legal authority.177
In another case, the defendants obtained letters of marque
from Confederate President Jefferson Davis.178 They outfitted a
ship in San Francisco for the express purpose of preying on United
States shipping in the Pacific, specifically on the route from
Panama to California.179 As they were leaving the pier in San
Francisco harbor, federal agents surrounded the ship and arrested
the defendants.180 In charging the jury on the meaning of levying
war, Justice Field, sitting as a circuit judge, pointed out that
levying war requires: (1) “an assemblage of persons in force, [(2)]
to overthrow the government, or to coerce its conduct.”181 The
overt act of levying war can be either an act by which “war is
brought into existence” or an act by which “war is prosecuted.”182
The act of outfitting the ship with an intention to use it against
United States shipping was sufficient to support a conviction for
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. United States v. Greiner, 26 F. Cas. 36, 39 (C.C.W.D. Mo. 1861) (No.
15,259).
175. Id.
176. See COOMBS, supra note 141, at 307–23.
177. Greiner, 26 F. Cas. at 39. The court relied on English authorities,
including: 1 Hale, P. C. 152; Fost. Crown Law, 218; and an unnamed Kings
Bench case found at 13 How. State Tr. 485; as well as Chief Justice
Marshall’s opinion in the Burr case (Cases Nos. 14,692a–14,694a).
178. United States v. Greathouse, 26 F. Cas. 18, 19 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1863)
(No. 15,254).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 20.
181. Id. at 22.
182. Id.
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treason, even though no force had been used against the United
States.183
By the time of the American Civil War, the law of treason, as
far as the elements required for levying war were concerned, had
been settled and was generally consistent with the classic English
writers.184 More importantly, it was consistent with the
Constitutional requirements that it be “determinate” and “stable”
as James Wilson had prescribed.185
IV. TREASON IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY—THE SECOND PRONG

The twentieth century saw the United States emerge as a
large, complex, modern state. Gone were the days when men were
tempted to take up arms against the enforcement of federal taxes
or even odious legislation, such as the Fugitive Slave Law.186 The
enemies of the United States were external: the German Empire
in 1917 and the Japanese Empire in 1941, along with the German
Reich of Adolf Hitler. Treason prosecutions no longer charged
levying war against the United States. Instead, the leading World
War II cases charged the second prong of the constitutional
definition: adhering to its enemies by giving them aid and comfort,
a more subtle form of betrayal than levying war.
In 1943, the Supreme Court received its first ever appeal from
a treason conviction.187 Anthony Cramer was born a German
national and became a naturalized American citizen in the
1930s.188 He was sympathetic to the aims of Germany, and he
made no secret of his opposition to American entrance into the
war against Germany,189 although Hitler gratuitously declared
war against the United States a few days after the attack on Pearl
Harbor in December 1941. In 1942, Cramer met twice publicly in
New York restaurants with two German friends who had arrived

183. Id. at 23.
184. See COKE, supra note 81; see also 1 SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY
OF PLEAS OF THE CROWN 131 (1736).
185. See WILSON, supra note 34.
186. See United States v. Hanway, 26 F. Cas. 105, 106 (C.C.E.D. Pa.
1851) (No. 15,299). In this case, the defendant was charged with treason for
resisting the execution of the Fugitive Slave Law; the jury acquitted him. Id.
187. See Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 1 (1945).
188. Id. at 3.
189. Id. at 4.

2018]

TREASON AND TERROR

33

unannounced in New York.190 They had left the United States
before war broke out and returned home to help Germany in the
war effort.191 Later the German government sent them and
others back to the United States by submarine to disrupt the
tried,
and
American war effort.192 Cramer was arrested,
convicted of treason on the grounds that he adhered to enemies of
the United States by giving them aid and comfort.193
The overt act, witnessed by two FBI agents, was nothing more
than Cramer’s public meetings in restaurants with the
saboteurs.194 There was no evidence as to what they discussed or
whether any plans were made at these two meetings.195 The
government did not even have any evidence from which an
inference could be made as to what happened, other than eating
and drinking together.196 The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed Cramer’s conviction.197 Upon review, the
Supreme Court reversed in a 5–4 decision written by Justice
Robert Jackson.198
The two elements of treason are intent and an overt act in
furtherance of that intent. Cramer’s adherence to Germany, the
enemy, was a state of mind and, thus, it was not susceptible to
direct proof. It could only be established by circumstantial
evidence: Cramer’s sympathies towards Germany were
tantamount to his adherence to the enemy.199 The overt act
charged was meeting publicly with the two saboteurs in
restaurants.200
The issue on appeal was not whether Cramer had a
treasonous intent, but whether his overt act of meeting twice with
the two saboteurs rose to the level of providing them with aid and
190. Id. at 5.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 6.
196. Id.
197. Cramer v. United States, 137 F.2d 888, 890 (2d Cir. 1944).
198. Cramer, 325 U.S. at 2. Justice Douglas wrote a vigorous dissent,
which included an extensive appendix mainly of legal authorities. Id. at 48–
76 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 31–32.
200. Id.

34

ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:1

comfort, so as to satisfy the constitutional definition of treason.201
They were the only overt acts charged. Cramer either knew, or
had reason to know, that the men he met with were enemies of the
United States. The issue, then, concerned the function of the
overt act. Cramer urged that the overt act “alone and on its face
must manifest a traitorous intention” while the Government
contended that “an apparently commonplace and insignificant act
and . . . other circumstances [may] create an inference that the act
was a step in treason and was done with treasonable intent.”202
The Supreme Court took the middle road between these two
contentions and held that the minimum function of the overt act
was to “show sufficient action by the accused . . . that [he] actually
gave aid and comfort to the enemy.”203 Since there was no
showing that these meetings conferred any benefit upon the two
saboteurs, Cramer did not provide aid and comfort to them.204 As
the Court said, “[m]eeting with Cramer in public drinking places
to tipple and trifle was no part of the saboteurs’ mission and did
not advance it.”205 This is the reason the Court reversed his
conviction.206 It is noteworthy that the Court did not hold that
the overt act must manifest a treasonous intent (although it could
have), only that the overt act must in fact give actual aid and
comfort to the enemy.207 The Court did not specify the quantum
of aid and comfort.
Cramer’s holding that the overt act must result in some aid
and comfort to the enemy—promoting or furthering the enemy’s
mission—is consistent with the constitutional definition of
treason, which specifies that the overt act following adherence to
the enemy must be accompanied by “giving aid and comfort.”208
201. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1.
202. Cramer, 325 U.S. at 34.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 37.
206. See Paul T. Crane, Did the Court Kill the Treason Charge?:
Reassessing Cramer. v. United States and its Significance, 36 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 635, 651–52 (2009). Crane has reviewed, among others, the papers of
Chief Justice Stone and of Justices Jackson, Frankfurter, and Douglas,
including memoranda from Supreme Court clerks. He has written a
fascinating account of what was really bothering the justices and why they
set this matter down for re-argument.
207. See id.
208. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1.
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The Constitution uses the word “giving,” which requires an actual
rendition of aid and comfort, not an overt act that would likely or
even could provide aid and comfort.209
In this respect, Cramer’s requirement that treason “consist of
something outward and visible and capable of direct proof” is
consistent with the framers’ intent to protect free speech and
political dissent.210 Justice Jackson made this point abundantly
clear: “[a] citizen intellectually or emotionally may favor the
enemy and harbor sympathies or convictions disloyal to this
country’s policy or interest, but so long as he commits no act of aid
and comfort to the enemy, there is no treason.”211
Cramer is the law.212 Its holding was roundly criticized in a
vigorous dissent by Justice Douglas on the grounds that it is a
departure from the historic function of the overt act in treason
cases.213 He pointed out that the purpose of the overt act
requirement is “to preclude punishment for treasonable plans or
schemes or hopes which have never moved out of the realm of
thought or speech.”214 All that is necessary is that
the
government “must . . . establish[] beyond a reasonable doubt that
the act was part of the treasonable project and done
in
furtherance of it.”215 Under this concept, Justice Douglas
concluded that Cramer’s conviction should have been affirmed.216
There have been other criticisms as well.217 A more modern
critique has pointed out that Cramer did not foreclose future

209. Id.
210. 325 U.S. at 29.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 48 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
214. Id. at 61.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 67.
217. The first and most telling criticism was by James Willard Hurst
almost immediately after the decision was announced. See WILSON, supra
note 34. Hurst was a young scholar on active duty with the Navy
Department in Washington. He was loaned to the office of the Attorney
General to prepare briefs for the re-argument. Hurst’s comments, insights,
and criticism must be taken seriously, because they are the seminal work of
the law of treason. However, the reader should also remember that Hurst
wrote for the losing side in Cramer and it is understandable that he would
not necessarily embrace a decision which reversed a major conviction.

36

ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:1

prosecutions and convictions for treason.218 The Court simply
made future prosecutions and convictions more difficult by
requiring the government to show that actual aid and comfort
were conferred on an enemy.219 By making a conviction more
difficult, Cramer follows the intent of James Wilson and other
drafters of the treason clause.220 As the dissent so aptly points
out, they made no bones about making a treason conviction
difficult for three good reasons: (1) “to preclude punishment for
treasonable plans or schemes or hopes which have never moved
out of the realm of thought and speech” thus removing treason as
a means of repressing political dissent; (2) “to foreclose
prosecutions for constructive treason” because the constitutional
definition of treason is “determinate” and may not be expanded;
and (3) to make sure that treason “is complete as a crime only
when the traitorous intent has ripened into a physical and
observable act.”221 These reasons were consistent with the
historical function of the overt act.222
Despite the assertions set forth by the Cramer dissent, as well
as other critics,223 convictions were upheld on appeal in other
major treason cases arising out of World War II. In these cases,
treason was based on the defendant’s adherence to the enemy by
giving aid and comfort.224 These cases focused on the element of
intent, because the overt acts clearly satisfied the aid and comfort
218. Crane, supra note 206, at 671.
219. See id. (maintaining that the paucity of treason trials in conjunction
with the Korean and Vietnam wars may be attributed to the creation of other
offenses which are easier to prove in the absence of the two-witness rule).
See Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 45 (1945), in which Justice Jackson
dropped more than a broad hint that Congress may prohibit “specified acts
thought detrimental to our wartime safety. . . . [T]hus eliminating
accusations of treachery and general intent to betray which have such
passion rousing potentialities.” Prosecution for these acts could be in lieu of a
prosecution for treason. Even so, on the same set of facts, an acquittal on a
charge of treason would not necessarily preclude a conviction on another
charge.
220. WILSON, supra note 34, at 1149–56.
221. Cramer, 325 U.S. at 61 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
222. Id.
223. Hurst, supra note 100, at 814–27.
224. See, e.g., D’Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338, 347–48 (9th Cir.
1951); Burgman v. United States, 188 F.2d 637, 639 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Best v.
United States, 184 F.2d 131, 133, 136–37 (1st Cir. 1950); Gillars v. United
States, 182 F.2d. 962, 966 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
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element of treason. The defendants actually provided aid and
comfort to the enemy.
Max Stephan provided food, shelter, money, and other
assistance to Hans Peter Krug, a Luftwaffe pilot, who had escaped
from a prisoner of war camp in Canada and made his way to
Detroit in 1942 after the United States and Germany went to
war.225 The Sixth Circuit affirmed Stephan’s treason conviction
in 1943.226 It was clear that Stephan had provided aid and
comfort to Krug. The essential element of treasonous intent was
inferred from the facts of the case.227
Cramer made clear that aid and comfort must actually be
provided to an enemy to sustain a conviction for treason.228 But
what about an otherwise innocent act, such as a father’s provision
of shelter and other assistance to a son? Max Haupt found that a
treasonous intent will transform an otherwise innocent act into
treason.229 He provided shelter and other assistance to his son,
known to him to be a saboteur and spy who returned to the United
States from Germany by submarine.230 Haupt’s defense was that
the aid and comfort he rendered to his son was not evidence of
adhering to an enemy of the United States or even of a treasonous
intent.231 Rather, it was only a father’s solicitude for his son and,
thus, was an innocent act.232 The jury found otherwise, and the
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.233
A treasonous intent may be inferred “from the natural
consequences [a speaker] knows will result from his acts.”234 A
person may have a First Amendment right to criticize the
president as he wishes, even intemperately, and to state that the
United States cannot win a war, and also to urge voters to elect a
new administration that will change policy.235 However, Douglas
225. Stephan v. United States, 133 F.2d. 87, 90 (6th Cir. 1943).
226. Id. at 100.
227. Id. at 90.
228. Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 29 (1945).
229. Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631, 641–42 (1947).
230. Id. at 633.
231. Id. at 634.
232. Id. at 641.
233. Id. at 631.
234. Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921, 943 (1st Cir. 1949). This
well-written opinion is both comprehensive and insightful.
235. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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Chandler went beyond the limits of his First Amendment rights
when he trafficked with the enemy by taking a paid position in
Nazi Germany’s propaganda organization and by making radio
broadcasts for the enemy.236 In doing so, he went “outside the
shelter of the First Amendment,” even though he may have
sincerely believed that Nazi Germany was “the bulwark of
Western Civilization against . . . the Jewish-Bolshevist
menace.”237 The jury could, and did, infer a treasonous intent
from the natural consequences of his propaganda broadcasts and
convicted him of treason.238
In 1952, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to rule again
on the sufficiency of overt acts in light of its holding in Cramer.239
Tomoya Kawakita was a dual national of both Japan and the
United States.240 He was in Japan at the outbreak of war in
December 1941 and remained there for the duration of the war.241
After the war, he was charged with treason on grounds that he
adhered to the enemy and rendered aid to Japan by his brutal
treatment of American prisoners of war while he was guarding
them.242
The Court agreed with the jury verdict that each of
Kawakita’s six overt acts of cruelty in fact gave aid and comfort to
the enemy, because they promoted the cause of Japan, as “[t]hey
were acts which tended to strengthen the enemy and advance its
236. Chandler, 171 F.2d at 924.
237. Id. at 925, 939.
238.
Other World War II propaganda cases also resulted in convictions.
See, e.g., Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d. 962 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (a defendant
made radio broadcasts for the German government); D’Aguino v. United
States, 192 F.2d. 338 (9th Cir. 1951) (notorious Tokyo Rose made broadcasts
for Japan). In both cases, the sufficiency of the overt acts was not challenged.
See also Best v. United States, 184 F.2d. 131 (1st Cir. 1950); Burgman v.
United States, 188 F.2d. 637 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (affirming the convictions for
treason of defendants who had made radio broadcasts for the German
government).
239.
Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 29 (1945). The court held that
“the crime of treason consists of two elements: adherence to the enemy; and
rendering him aid and comfort. A citizen intellectually or emotionally may
favor the enemy and harbor sympathies or convictions disloyal to this
country’s policy or interest, but so long as he commits no act of aid and
comfort to the enemy, there is no treason.” Id.
240.
Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 719 (1952).
241. Id. at 721.
242. Id. at 738.
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interests.”243 The Court stressed the importance of the nature of
the overt act, which presumably means the ultimate effect of
conferring benefit on the enemy.244 The Court said,
The act may be unnecessary to a successful completion of
the enemy’s project; it may be an abortive attempt; it may
in the sum total of the enemy’s effort be a casual and
unimportant step. But if it gives aid and comfort to the
enemy at the immediate moment of its performance, it
qualifies as an overt act within the constitution of
treason.245
In this respect, the Court followed Marshall’s reasoning in Ex
Parte Bollman, “[i]f war be actually levied . . . all those who
perform any part, however minute, or however remote from the
scene of action, and who are actually leagued in the general
conspiracy are to be considered as traitors.”246
Because of the World War II cases, the second prong of the
law of treason became well settled. The character of the overt act
and not its success, or even its failure, is the proper focus of any
inquiry: Did adherence to the enemy result in any aid and comfort
to the enemy by advancing the enemy cause? If so, there would be
betrayal and thus, treason.
V. TREASON AND THE WAR AGAINST TERROR

The Constitution specifies that treason consists of only two
acts: levying war against the United States and adhering to its
enemies by giving them aid and comfort.247 The first treason
cases involved armed domestic rebellion against the federal

243. Id. at 741.
244. Id. at 738.
245.
Id. at 738; see also Rex v. Casement, 1 K.B. 98, 133 (1917)
(enunciating the English standard, which is conceptually the same: “If a
British subject does an act which strengthens or tends to strengthen the
enemies of the King in the conduct of a war against the King, that is in law
the giving of aid and comfort to the King’s enemies. Again, if a British
subject commits an act which weakens or tends to weaken the power of the
King and of the country to resist or to attack the enemies of the King and the
country, that is in law the giving of aid and comfort the King’s enemies.”).
246.
Kawakita, 343 U.S. at 738 (citing Ex Parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4
Cranch.) 75, 126 (1807)).
247.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1.
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government.248 The most recent World War II cases involved a
foreign enemy. Germany and Japan were easily discernable as
enemies because war had been declared. However, in the twentyfirst century, the enemy in the war against terror has not been a
state and its forces are seldom armed and arrayed in a traditional
military manner, all of which makes its identification as an enemy
difficult. Whether the enemy is al-Qaeda or another group, the
fact remains that the main “enemy” in the war against terror is
not a state, although a state may succor and even encourage nonstate actors in their endeavors. At home, the threats are covert
and frequently the “enemy” can be identified only with difficulty
before he strikes.
These changed circumstances do not mean that treason is now
an outmoded legal concept, or even that other statutes have
superseded treason as the most appropriate legal weapon in the
proper circumstances. At its root, treason is a crime
of
betrayal.249 Thus, courts have stated, “[n]o crime is greater than
treason.”250 The treason statute is not aimed at “any person,”
rather it applies only to citizens who owe a duty of loyalty or
allegiance to the state, and to non-citizens who enjoy its
protection.251 In this way, it is reserved for the most egregious
overt acts, which involve an intent to betray the United States.252
Prosecutions for treason are a matter of self-preservation for a
248.
See Respublica v. Abraham Carlisle, 1 U.S. 35 (1778); Respublica v.
John Roberts, 1 U.S. 39 (1778).
249.
D’Aguino v. United States, 192 F.2d. 338, 366 (9th Cir. 1951).
250. Hanauer v. Doane, 79 U.S. 343, 347 (1870).
251.
“Treason is a breach of allegiance, and can be committed by him only
who owes allegiance either perpetual or temporary.” United States v.
Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 97 (1820). See 5 Journals of the
Continental Congress, supra note 52, which specifically applied to “all
persons abiding within any of the United Colonies, and deriving protection
from the laws of the same.” This was the same concept that led Wilson to
conclude that non-citizens, as well as citizens, can commit treason against
the United States. See WILSON, supra note 34, at 1153. For a more modern
application of “allegiance,” see United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d. 88, 113
(2d Cir. 1999), in which the Second Circuit in a per curiam opinion, unlike
Wiltberger, did not make any distinction between perpetual or temporary
allegiance. Even so, no court has ever held, or even indicated, that noncitizens by definition cannot commit treason against the United States. To do
so would not only be illogical, but it would also fly in the face of substantial
legal history.
252.
See D’Aguino, 192 F.2d at 366.
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state, that is, for the body politic to which the traitor belongs
either permanently or temporarily.253
An early, if not the first, attack against the United States in
the war of terror was the 1993 bombing of the World Trade
Center. The perpetrators of this attack were not charged with
treason.254 However, they were tried and later convicted of
seditious conspiracy.255 In holding that the defendants were
convicted under the correct statute, the Second Circuit pointed out
that the crime of treason is limited to “betrayals of allegiance that
are substantial” and only to levying war and rendering aid and
comfort to enemies.256 Whether some or all the defendants could
have been charged with treason is moot.257
The horrendous attacks of September 11, 2001, revealed to
the American public that the United States was in fact involved in
a new kind of war. However, even afterwards, some Americans
sided with the enemy. Many Americans who supported the
terrorists have been charged with various federal crimes, such as
seditious conspiracy. Surprisingly, only one indictment
for
treason against an American citizen, Adam Gadahn, has
resulted.258 However, Gadahn might have been killed in
Waziristan in 2008 after the indictment was returned and is still
missing. Thus, he may never come to trial.259 The thrust of the
indictment is that Gadahn was an American citizen who adhered
to enemies of the United States by giving them aid and comfort.260
253.
Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d. 921, 930 (1st Cir. 1948).
254.
Treason is defined in U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1. Pursuant to this
definition, Congress made it a crime to engage in treason in 1790, and
prescribed a penalty now codified as 18 U.S.C. § 2381.
255.
Seditious conspiracy is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2384. See United
States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d. 88, 114 (2d Cir. 1999).
256.
Rahman, 189 F.3d at 114.
257.
The two-witness rule makes treason more difficult to prove than
other crimes, which may be at least a partial explanation of why seditious
conspiracy, rather than treason, was charged. See Cramer v. United States,
325 U.S. 1, 33 (1945) (noting that the two-witness rule serves as a
“protection” for defendants in treason cases).
258.
He was indicted in the United States District Court for the Central
District of California in 2005. See Gadahn Indictment, supra note 12.
259.
The FBI listed Adam Yahiye Gadahn as one of the FBI’s Most
Wanted Terrorists in 2006. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Most Wanted
Terrorist – Adam Gadahn (Oct. 11, 2006), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/
news/stories/2006/october/gadahn_101106.
260.
Gadahn Indictment, supra note 12, at 2–3.
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The specific acts charged were making various videos for alQaeda.261 In doing so, he breached his duty of allegiance to the
United States, that is, the social contract.262 His indictment for
treason in 2006 was the first since World War II.263 If only for
this reason, it is worth examining.
The indictment opens with a statement that, pursuant to
section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Secretary
of State has designated al-Qaeda as a foreign terrorist
organization.264 Presumably, this designation is sufficient to
qualify al-Qaeda as an “enemy” of the United States. The
indictment continues by describing the September 11, 2001,
attacks and the assertion by Osama bin Laden, as leader of alQaeda, that those attacks were an al-Qaeda operation.265
The indictment then alleges that Gadahn is an American
citizen whose last known residence was in Orange County,
California and, importantly, that he owes allegiance to the United
States as a citizen.266 The gravamen of the offense is that he
adhered to al-Qaeda, “an enemy of the United States . . . with
intent to betray the United States” by committing five overt acts,
all of which were appearances in al-Qaeda propaganda videos.267
Statements that he allegedly made are recited in the indictment,
including: “Fighting and defeating America is our first
priority . . . .”; “So after all the atrocities committed by
America . . . why should we target their military only?”; and
“Escape from the unbelieving side and join the winning
side . . . .”268 Presumably, these videos were made outside the
United States, probably in Afghanistan or Pakistan.
Gadahn’s acts mirror those of Douglas Chandler, as Gadahn
also went abroad, joined an enemy propaganda organization and
made communications, which were later broadcast, and thus
261. Id. at 3–8.
262. See PHILLIPSON, supra note 33, at 110.
263. Dan Eggen & Karen DeYoung, U.S. Supporter of Al-Qaeda Is
Indicted on Treason Charge, WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 12, 2006),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/11/AR200610
1101121.html.
264. Gadahn Indictment, supra note 12, at 1.
265. Id. at 2.
266. Id. at 2–3.
267. Id. at 3–8.
268. Id. at 3, 5, 7.
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advanced the cause of an enemy of the United States by giving
them aid and comfort.269 Making propaganda broadcasts for an
enemy meets the standard of Cramer, which held that the offense
of treason requires that the defendant give actual aid and comfort
to that enemy.270 Underlying these overt acts is Gadahn’s clear
intent to betray the United States. Treason is the appropriate
charge in his case.
In order to support a charge of treason, the facts of each case
must clearly and precisely fit into the definition of this crime.
Adam Gadahn, along with others, had not only adhered to the
enemy, but he has also trafficked with them, and in doing so, has
given them aid and comfort.271 The facts as stated in Gadahn’s
indictment fairly support a charge of treason.272 In other
instances, the facts have ranged from ambiguous to inconclusive
so far as a charge of treason is concerned. In those instances,
unlike in Gadahn’s case, prosecution under statutes other than
treason was clearly warranted.
Gadahn might be tempted to use the First Amendment as a
defense to these charges.273 He might claim that in making the
videos he was merely exercising his right of free speech and that
the treason statute infringes upon that right. This defense will be
of no avail to him. The First Circuit in Chandler v. United
States274 pointed out that Chandler trafficked with the Nazis by
joining their propaganda organization and then making
broadcasts for it. The court concluded, “[i]t is preposterous to talk
about freedom of speech in this connection . . . .”275 It is difficult
to imagine that a court would fail to follow Chandler. In addition,
269. Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921, 924–25 (1st Cir. 1948).
270. There were multiple treason cases involving defendants who
rendered propaganda services to Germany during World War II. See, e.g.,
Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 34 (1945); see also D’Aquino v. United
States, 192 F.2d 338, 347–48 (9th Cir. 1951); Burgman v. United States, 188
F.2d 637, 639 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Best v. United States, 184 F.2d 131, 133, 136–
37 (1st Cir. 1950); Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d. 962, 966 (D.C. Cir.
1950).
271. See Gadahn Indictment, supra note 12, at 2–3, 9.
272. See id.
273. The Chandler court agreed that making disloyal statements is not
treason, but when they are coupled with “an intent to betray” such
statements can be an act of treason. 171 F.2d at 938.
274. Id. at 939.
275. Id.
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both the treason clause and the First Amendment are
constitutional provisions, and thus, both must be given effect
unless the First Amendment repealed or modified the treason
clause. That conclusion is indeed a long shot bordering on the
preposterous.
An examination of some of the more publicized prosecutions
arising out of the war against terror shows a wide variety of
methods, acts, and conspiracies to act. Some individuals acted
alone; others acted in concert with groups of varying sizes. Some
instances involved pre-emptive arrests, which curtailed the acts
and subsequently prevented a ripening into treason while also
preventing significant property damage and loss of life. All of
these people shared a common antipathy to the United States, and
an intent to betray the United States. But few, if any, of these
acts rose to the level of treason.
Bryant Neal Vinas went to Afghanistan specifically to join the
Taliban so that he could fight the Americans.276 He admitted to
participating in two raids on American military installations in
which two rockets were fired; fortunately without effect.277 He
joined an enemy military force, which was armed and arrayed in a
military manner appropriate to the circumstances and
intentionally engaged in a military operation against a United
States military base.278 These acts amounted to levying war
against the United States with the requisite intent to betray the
United States.279 Thus, he could have been charged with treason,
but he was not. Instead, he was charged with and pleaded guilty
to conspiring to murder United States nationals, providing
material support to al-Qaeda and receiving military training from
al-Qaeda.280 However, he did provide American authorities with
significant intelligence about an al Qaeda plot to blow up a Long

276. Claire Suddath, Bryant Neal Vinas: An American in Al Qaeda, L.A.
TIMES
(July
24,
2009),
http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/
0,8599,1912512,00.html.
277. See Superseding Information at 2, United States v. Vinas, No. 08-823
(NGG) (S-1) (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2009).
278. See id. at 2–3.
279. See id.
280. William K. Rashbaum & Souad Mekhennet, L.I. Man Helped Qaeda,
Then Informed, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/
07/23/nyregion/23terror.html.
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Island Railroad commuter train in Penn Station.281 His
cooperation with authorities may partially explain why he was not
charged with treason for his earlier participation with the
Taliban, even though those acts were a significant act of betrayal
of the United States. However, even if he may have participated
in the al Qaeda plot in Penn Station, those acts alone do not rise
to the level of treason. A mere plot or conspiracy is not treason.
An overt act is required.
Michael Finton and Najibullah Zazi both attempted to wage
war against the United States in furtherance of a terrorist cause.
Both men had the requisite intent to betray the United States.
However, both were arrested before their overt acts could ripen
into treason. Finton is an American citizen who attempted to
bomb the federal building in Springfield, Illinois.282 He pleaded
guilty to charges of attempted murder and attempted use of a
weapon of mass destruction.283 He is currently serving a twentyeight-year term.284 Najibullah Zazi is a Pashtun citizen of
Afghanistan, but he is also a legal resident of the United
States.285 He was accused of planning a suicide bombing of the
New York subway, and has pleaded guilty to charges of conspiring
to use weapons of mass destruction, conspiracy to commit murder
in a foreign country, and providing material support to a terrorist
organization.286
The case of Colleen LaRose, also known as “Jihad Jane,” is
281. Id.
282. Office of Public Affairs, Illinois Man Admits Plotting to Bomb
Federal Courthouse and Is Sentenced to 28 Years in Prison, DEP’T. OF JUSTICE
(May 9, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/illinois-man-admits-plottingbomb-federal-courthouse-and-sentenced-28-years-prison [hereinafter DOJ
Illinois Sentence].
283. Id.; Dirk Johnson, Suspect in Illinois Bomb Plot ‘Didn’t Like America
Very
Much,’
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
27,
2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/28/us/28springfield.html.
284. DOJ Illinois Sentence, supra note 282.
285. Phil Hirschkorn, Would-be subway suicide bomber Najibullah Zazi
speaks, CBS NEWS (Apr. 19, 2012, 12:25 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/
would-be-subway-suicide-bomber-najibullah-zazi-speaks/.
286. Id. However, it took until 2015 for the Court to render a sentence.
Office of Public Affairs, Al-Qaeda Operative Sentenced to 40 Years in Prison
for Role in International Terrorism Plot that Targeted the United States and
Europe, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Nov. 24, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/alqaeda-operative-sentenced-40-years-prison-role-international-terrorism-plottargeted.
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different.287 She is an American citizen who has encouraged
enlistment in al-Qaeda, a foreign terrorist organization.288
Clearly, the first prong of treason is satisfied, as she has adhered
to the enemy, al-Qaeda. However, it remains to be seen whether
her recruiting has produced recruits, and thus, has given aid and
comfort the enemy. For this reason, prosecutors could examine
her case closely to determine whether she should be charged with
treason. Yet, they will not do so, because she has already been
charged with conspiracy to murder Lars Vilks, a Swedish artist
who drew a cartoon with the head of Mohammed on a dog, as well
as a charge of providing material support to terrorists.289 She
pled guilty to the conspiracy to commit murder charge on
February 1, 2011, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania.290 At the time of her pleading, there
were indications that she intended to change her “not guilty plea”
of providing material support to terrorists, to “guilty.”291
John Walker Lindh, born 1981, was one of the first to face the
combined wrath of the American people and the determination of
the federal government to prosecute someone in the wake of the
attacks of September 11, 2001.292 As a teenager in Marin County,
California, he converted to Islam, and before he was eighteen, he
had traveled to Yemen to study Arabic.293 He then went to
Afghanistan, where he attended an al-Qaeda training camp, and
later joined the Taliban.294 He participated in the Taliban’s
287. Carrie Johnson, JihadJane, an American Woman, Faces Terrorism
Charges, WASH. POST (May 10, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/03/09/AR2010030902670_pf.html.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Office of Public Affairs, Colorado Woman Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy
to Provide Material Support to Terrorists, DEP’T. OF JUSTICE (Mar. 8, 2011),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/colorado-woman-pleads-guilty-conspiracyprovide-material-support-terrorists.
291. See Associated Press, Pennsylvania: Plea Change for ‘Jihad Jane,’
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/29/us/29brfsJane.html?ref=topics.
292. The Case of the Taliban American, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/CNN/
Programs/people/shows/walker/profile.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2017).
293. Id.
294. See Proffer of Facts in Support of Defendant’s Suppression Motion at
2, United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2002) (No. 02-37-A),
available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/lindh/uslindh61302dstat.pdf
[hereinafter Lindh Suppression Motion Proffer of Facts].
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campaign against the Northern Alliance in 2001.295 He was
aware of the attacks of September 11, but remained with the
Taliban nevertheless.296 He was ultimately captured by forces of
the Northern Alliance, and was in captivity when representatives
of the United States Government interrogated him and other
captives.297 The Taliban captives rioted and killed an American
interrogator, Johnny Michael Spann.298
It is not clear when Lindh identified himself to his American
captors as an American citizen. However, early in his
interrogation, he requested to see a lawyer, but none were
available in the field, or even later when he was in military
custody.299 What is clear is that his treatment while in American
custody was rough, and possibly even inhumane; it is a surprise
that he survived this ordeal.300 He was photographed blindfolded
and bound naked in a container.301 This iconic photograph
became a representation of the fate of a young man who had left
his country to fight for the enemy, but not necessarily against the
United States. Even so, Lindh received extraordinary public
opprobrium and antipathy as a traitor.302
Lindh was not indicted for treason. Rather, of the ten counts
in his indictment half were for conspiracy and only two were for
295. Id.
296. Indictment, Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 (No. 02-37-A), available at
https://www.justice.gov/archives/ag/united-states-district-court-easterndistrict-virginia-alexandria-division [hereinafter Lindh Indictment].
297. Lindh Suppression Motion Proffer of Facts, supra note 294, at 10, 14.
298. Lindh Indictment, supra note 296, at ¶ 25.
299. Lindh Suppression Motion Proffer of Facts, supra note 294, at 16; see
also Defendant’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Motion to Suppress Statements of Violation of His Fifth Amendment Rights
(Miranda and Edwards) at 19, 21, U.S. v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D.
Va. 2002) (No. 02-37-A), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/
docs/lindh/uslindh61302sup5th.pdf [hereinafter Lindh Motion to Suppress
Statements Points and Authorities].
300. The rigor and the events of Lindh’s ordeal attendant upon his
capture by American forces was of no avail in his attempts to dismiss the
indictment against him. See Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 545.
301. Lindh Motion to Suppress Statements Points and Authorities, supra
note 299, at 18.
302. See Suzanne Kelly Babb, Note, Fear and Loathing in America:
Application of Treason Law in Times of National Crisis and the Case of John
Walker Lindh, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1721 (2003), for a reasonably balanced
account.
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actual acts: supplying services to the Taliban and using and
carrying firearms during crimes of violence.303 After lengthy
negotiations, he pleaded guilty to the two acts as charged and the
remaining eight conspiracy charges were dismissed.304 He was
sentenced to twenty years’ confinement.
Did Lindh commit treason as many have claimed? Probably
not, because treason is strictly defined and reserved for the
extreme cases where “betrayals of allegiance [] are substantial.”305
The evidence of the overt acts at best is ambiguous. Lindh did
levy war against the Northern Alliance, but there is no clear
evidence that he levied war against the United States. The
interesting question remains as to whether the services he
supplied to the Taliban amounted to aid and comfort under the
constitutional definition of treason.
At the heart of the matter, the question of his intent remains.
Without the requisite intent to betray the United States, Lindh’s
acts do not rise to the level of treason. Clearly, he adhered to the
Taliban by attending their training camp, and participating in the
campaign against the Northern Alliance. However, it remains to
be seen whether a reasonable jury could find that by doing so he
intended to betray the United States, especially in the face of his
assertion that he was following his Islamic faith. Indeed, Lindh
could have asserted the defense of duress; he could have claimed a
policy of both the Taliban and the Northern Alliance to use
coercive tools to enforce “loyalty” on their respective sides.
Duress, then, would negate the requisite intent to betray the
United States.
So far none of these cases, with the notable exception of Adam
Gadahn, merit a charge of treason. However, a treason charge is
still a viable option under the proper circumstances. For example,
consider these plausible but hypothetical facts: A group of ten
young men, all born in the United States and educated in local
schools, received military training from a terrorist group or
organization abroad in the use of weapons, and in the conception
and execution of military operations to wreak havoc in the United
303. Lindh Indictment, supra note 296.
304. Tom Jackman, In Deal, Lindh Pleads Guilty to Aiding Taliban,
WASH. POST, July 16, 2002, at A1.
305. United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 114 (2d Cir. 1999) (alteration
in original).
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States for the purpose of bringing down the government. In
furtherance of this goal, they conceived a scheme and plotted to
attack a major military base during its outdoor ceremonies while
the Secretary of Defense is speaking. The purpose of this attack
was to make war on the United States. They acquired the
appropriate weapons and the means to deliver the payloads of
these weapons. Their leader had even served as a junior officer in
the United States Armed Forces. Moments before they were to
make the attack, the FBI arrested them. No shots were fired.
These facts support a charge of treason by levying war against
the United States. The men were assembled and arrayed in a
military manner, and they were about to make an attack. These
men levied war against the United States. John Marshall
described the overt act of levying war in the Burr trial in 1807:
“[W]ar might be levied without a battle, or the actual application
of force to the object on which it was designed to act; that a body of
men assembled for the purpose of war, and being in a posture of
war, do levy war . . . .”306 These ten men in the above hypothetical
were assembled and arrayed in a military manner to conduct an
attack on a United States military base. This would be enough to
make it an overt act of treason. Because treasonous intent may be
inferred from the act itself, the fact that the attack was frustrated
only by their arrest, before any weapons were fired, is of no
moment.
The Constitution requires two witnesses to the same overt
act, which in this case should not be difficult.307 However,
treasonous intent may be proved by circumstantial evidence.
Indeed, in these circumstances the overt act is “evidence of the
treasonable purpose and intent” of its perpetrators.308 These ten
men in the above hypothetical were in the process of executing
their plan, and had the capability of executing it. The matter had
left the realm of conspiracy and entered the realm of action.
Moreover, these men had received appropriate training by a
terrorist group specifically for the purpose of making an attack
against the United States. In addition, the FBI could have other
306. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 201, 203 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No.
14,694) (alteration in original).
307. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1.
308. United States v. Cramer, 325 U.S. 1, 32 (1945).
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evidence of intent, not only from witnesses, but from legitimate
wiretaps or computer based sources. Based on these facts, a
reasonable jury could find that the ten men had the requisite
treasonous intent. Their overt act became treason under the
Constitution when it was accompanied by this intent.
While there is little, if any, dispute over what the acts were,
the intent of these men still should be scrutinized carefully. At
the very least they intended to destroy property which they knew
would result in numerous deaths. However, their ultimate
purpose was to bring down the United States government. So long
as the government can produce evidence upon which a reasonable
jury could find their intent was to levy war against the United
States, and not just to murder unnamed individuals and destroy
government property, then the jury could return a finding of
guilty on a treason charge.309 Levying war against the United
States is treason because, at root, it is an attack on the body
politic and a breach of the underlying social contract. Thus, the
attack as planned was essentially an attack on all Americans,
even if it was ultimately unsuccessful.
These men would probably assert lack of treasonous intent as
a defense. However, their leader would be able to assert a novel
defense. As an officer of the armed forces, he took an oath to
support and defend the Constitution. He could assert the defense
used by Jefferson Davis in 1868 to quash his indictment for
treason. The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution came
into effect in early 1868. Davis claimed that the disability from
holding public office in section 3 of that Amendment constituted
punishment and thus the Constitution prohibited a subsequent
prosecution for treason.310 The motion to quash was heard in the
309. In addition, a jury could also return a verdict of guilty on lesser
charges, such as conspiracy to murder government officials, under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1117 or an attempted offense under 18 U.S.C. § 2332b, “Acts of Terrorism
Transcending National Boundaries.” 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1117, 2332b (Westlaw
through Pub. L. No. 115-51).
310. Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or
elector of President or Vice President, or hold any office, civil or
military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having
previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer
of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as
an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the
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Circuit Court for Virginia, which failed to rule on it. Instead, the
matter was sent to the Supreme Court. However, in December
1868, President Johnson issued a blanket pardon, which included
Jefferson Davis, thus making the motion to quash moot. However,
one question is still unanswered: whether the disability clause is a
punishment for persons who have taken an oath to support the
Constitution but later engage in rebellion or insurrection—that is,
levying war—and thus precludes a prosecution for the crime of
treason.311
The facts of this hypothetical meet the strict Constitutional
requirements for a charge of treason. The overt act of preparing
an attack on a United States military installation and the ability
to launch it when coupled with the requisite treasonous intent,
which may be inferred from the overt act itself, present a clear
and convincing case of treason by levying war against the United
States. A charge of treason is appropriate and it may be coupled
with other lesser offenses.
CONCLUSION

An act of treason is a betrayal of the political body, because it
is a deliberate, intentional breach of the social contract. John
Marshall correctly observed that treason is “the most atrocious
offense which can be committed against the political body”312 and

Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection
or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House,
remove such disability.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3.
311. Following the collapse of the Confederate Government there were
four charges of treason filed against Davis. The motion to quash concerned
the fourth charge. It was argued brilliantly by distinguished counsel. See
Case of Davis, 7 F. Cas. 63 (C.C.D. Va. 1867-1871) (No. 3621); see also Trial
of Jefferson Davis.; The Motion to Quash the Indictment—Argument of Robert
Ould, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 1868), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?
res=9D01E6DF1E3AEF34BC4C53DFB4678383679FDE&legacy=true.
See
Horace Henry Hagan, The United States v. Jefferson Davis, 25 SEWANEE REV.
220, 223–25 (1917), for a discussion about the constitutional question. See C.
Ellen Connally, The Use of the Fourteenth Amendment by Salmon P. Chase in
the Trial of Jefferson Davis, 42 AKRON L. REV. 1165 (2009), for a thorough
account of the trial.
312. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 2, 13 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No.
14,692).
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that “there is no crime which can more excite and agitate the
passions of men than treason.”313 Recorded history is replete with
examples of how the betrayal implicit in treason strikes at the
very heart of society. Consider the fate of Eretria, a small Greek
city on the island of Euboea, under siege by the Persian king
Xerxes. Only two citizens of Eretria opened the gates to the
Persians, who sacked and burned the city and then enslaved the
inhabitants.314 Because everyone is a victim, treason should be
charged only for the most atrocious, the most serious, and the
most heinous offenses.
American history is similarly replete with examples of the
extraordinary passions that even a perception of betrayal can
ignite, regardless of whether formal charges were preferred.
Notable examples are former vice-president Aaron Burr in 1807,
and in modern times, the actress Jane Fonda in 1970, and John
Walker Lindh in 2001. Burr was tried and acquitted.315 Fonda
was not even charged, and Lindh pleaded guilty to lesser
offenses.316 All three were widely believed to have betrayed the
United States. The acts of all three excited and agitated public
passions.
Congress has enacted extensive legislation covering a wide
variety of lesser, but still very serious, offenses that might
otherwise be considered treasonous and has made it applicable to
both citizens and residents of the United States.317 These
statutes have been invoked in numerous instances in the war
313. Ex Parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch.) 75, 125 (1807).
314. FELTEN, supra note 2, at 255–56.
315. COOMBS, supra note 141, at 352–54.
316. See Henry Mark Holzer, Why Not Call it Treason?: From Korea to
Afghanistan, 29 S.U. L. REV. 181 (2002), for an informative, but polemical
article. See also HENRY MARK HOLZER & ERIKA HOLZER, supra note 9, at 162.
317. Chapter 115 of Title 18 of the United States Code not only contains
the treason statute (§ 2381), but also misprision of treason (§ 2382), rebellion
or insurrection (§ 2383), seditious conspiracy (§ 2384), and advocating
overthrow of Government (§ 2385). 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2381–2385 (Westlaw
through Pub. L. No. 115-51). Additionally, 18 U.S.C. § 2332a applies to the
use of weapons of mass destruction, specifically against a national of the
United States or within the United States, and § 2332b applies to acts of
terrorism transcending national boundaries. Id. § 2332a–2332b (Westlaw).
The defendants in the World Trade Center bombing in 1993 were convicted of
seditious conspiracy under § 2384. Id. § 2384 (Westlaw). The convictions
were affirmed in United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 160 (2d Cir. 1999).
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against terror, and convictions have resulted. Nevertheless, the
constitutionally defined crime of treason remains available to
prosecute the most egregious offenses.
The modern state representing contemporary society not only
has the right, but also the duty to enforce the loyalty of its
members and those who enjoy its protection. Treason is a crime of
betrayal, because it is a threat to the security of all members of
society. Society has determined that traitors should be punished.
However, the Constitution limits the acts that constitute treason,
and then it provides important procedural safeguards first by
requiring two witnesses to the same overt act and then by
excluding out of court confessions. In this way, the Constitution
adequately protects both the interests of the state to punish
betrayal and the rights of the accused. Treason is still a valid
legal tool and it should be used.

